Employee Internet Privacy: A Proposed Act that Balances Legitimate Employer Rights and Employee Privacy by Park, Susan
Boise State University
ScholarWorks
Management Faculty Publications and
Presentations Department of Management
1-1-2014
Employee Internet Privacy: A Proposed Act that
Balances Legitimate Employer Rights and
Employee Privacy
Susan Park
Boise State University
This document was originally published in 2014 in American Business Law Journal in volume 51, issue 4, pages 779-841 by the Academy of Legal Studies
in Business. Copyright restrictions may apply. doi: 10.1111/ablj.12039
Employee Internet Privacy:
A Proposed Act that Balances
Legitimate Employer Rights and
Employee Privacy
Susan Park*
INTRODUCTION
When Justin Basset interviewed for a job in New York City in 2012, he
expected to respond to questions one is typically asked in a job interview.
However, his interview took a modern technological twist when the inter-
viewer opened her computer and attempted to look at Mr. Basset’s Face-
book profile on her computer. Unable to see the details of his profile
because he had taken advantage of Facebook’s privacy options to limit
public viewing, she asked for his login information to access his account.
He declined and withdrew his application.1 In 2010, Robert Collins, a
Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services
employee, was interviewed to determine whether he was eligible for rein-
statement after taking a leave of absence following a death in the family.
His supervisors asked for his Facebook password during the interview so
they could look at his profile to help them determine whether he was
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College of Business and Economics. The author thanks Boise State MBA Graduate Assistant
Molly Haberl for her valuable research and analysis and W. Anthony Park and Betsy Hall for
their editorial suggestions.
1Manuel Valdes & Shannon McFarland, Employers Ask Job Seekers for Facebook Passwords, SEATTLE
TIMES (Mar. 20, 2012, 4:36 AM), http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2017794577
_apusjobapplicantsfacebook.html.
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involved in gang-related activity. He complied, reluctantly.2 In 2009, the
City of Bozeman, Montana, employed a practice of asking job applicants
for password information for their e-mail, social networking, and other
online accounts.3 Similar incidents in Illinois, Virginia, and Michigan have
also been reported.4
The number of employers who search the Internet for information
about job applicants and employees has been on the rise for years. This
phenomenon has been widely reported and is almost universally consid-
ered to be legally permissible.5 However, this avenue for information
gathering may be becoming less fruitful for employers as more social
media users adjust their privacy settings to restrict access to their profiles.6
2Allie Bohm, Maryland Legislature to Employers: Hands Off Facebook Passwords, ACLU BLOG OF
RIGHTS (Apr. 9, 2012), http://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty/maryland-legislature-
employers-hands-facebook-passwords (quoting Collins, “I felt violated, I felt disrespected, I
felt that my privacy was invaded. But not only my privacy, the privacy of my friends and that
of my family that didn’t ask for that.”); see also Robin M. Sheridan, New Password Protection
Laws Have Employers A-“Twitter”, HR INSIGHTS FOR HEALTH CARE (Oct. 30, 2012), http://
www.hallrender.com/insights/new-password-protection-laws-have-employers-a-twitter.
3Valdes & McFarland, supra note 1; see also Matt Gouras, Montana City Asks Job Applicants for
Facebook Passwords, HUFFINGTON POST ( June 19, 2009, 8:58 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/2009/06/19/montana-ckty-asks-job-app_n_218152.html; Declan McCullagh, Want a Job?
Give Bozeman Your Facebook, Google Passwords, CNET NEWS ( June 18, 2009, 4:52 PM), http://
news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10268282-38.html.
4Valdes & McFarland, supra note 1; see also Megan Garber, Is Your Facebook Password Like Your
Mail, House Key, or Drug Test?, ATLANTIC (Apr. 3, 2012, 7:19 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2012/04/is-your-facebook-password-like-your-mail-house-key-or-drug
-test/255354/ (reporting on an incident occurring in Michigan).
5See, e.g., Robert Sprague, Rethinking Information Privacy in an Age of Online Transparency, 25
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 395, 401 (2008) (“The manner in which the right to privacy in the
United States has developed. . . affords essentially no protection for applicants when pro-
spective employers turn to the Internet to investigate their thoughts, musings, recreations, or
even what others may have said about them online.”); Managing Your Online Image Across Social
Networks, REPPLER EFFECT (Sept. 27, 2011), http://blog.reppler.com/2011/09/27/managing-
your-online-image-across-social-networks/ (reporting that a Reppler survey of three hundred
professionals involved in their companies’ hiring process revealed that ninety-one percent
use social networking to screen job applicants).
6See MARY MADDEN, PRIVACY MANAGEMENT ON SOCIAL MEDIA SITES 7–8, 13 (2012), available
at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2012/PIP_Privacy_management_on
_social_media_sites_022412.pdf (reporting that a 2011 national survey of 2277 adults
revealed that fifty-eight percent restrict access to their social media profiles); Benny
Evangelista, Facebook Friend Lists Shrinking to Guard Privacy, SFGATE (Feb. 25, 2012), http://www
.sfgate.com/business/article/Facebook-friend-lists-shrinking-to-guard-privacy-3360189.php;
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Thus, at least some employers have begun to ask for social media user-
name or password information so they can take a look behind the scenes to
learn more about the applicant or employee.7 Facebook and others who
follow developments in social media have expressed alarm at what they
believe is a growing trend that has important privacy implications.8 Others
argue that these incidents are isolated and are not indicative of a mean-
ingful shift in employer behavior.9
Alexia Tsotsis, Most People Have Changed Their Privacy Settings on Facebook, Says Facebook CTO,
TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 19, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/10/19/most-people-have-changed-
their-privacy-settings-on-facebook-says-facebook-cto/ (quoting Facebook CTO Bret Taylor
that “the majority of people on Facebook have modified their privacy settings”); What Is the
“Norm” for Privacy Settings on Social Networking Sites?, IKEEPSAFE, http://www.ikeepsafe.org/be-
a-pro/privacy/what-is-the-norm-for-privacy-settings-on-social-networking-sites/ (“That 80%
of the public goes to the effort of changing their settings to private indicates that users care
deeply about their privacy online . . . .”).
7See supra text accompanying notes 1–4; see also Jerilyn Jacobs, What’s Your Password? Pending
Password Protection Provisions, GONZALEZ SAGGIO & HARLAN (Aug. 29, 2012), http://
www.gshllp.com/60-second-memos/whats-your-password-pending-password-protection
-provisions (stating that as job applicants “began limiting what information from their
accounts was available to the public, some employers decided to raise the stakes even higher
by asking applicants to provide their user name [and] passwords so that the employer could
access the site and take a look around”).
8See, e.g., Michelle Poore, A Call for Uncle Sam to Get Big Brother Out of Our Knickers: Protecting
Privacy and Freedom of Speech Interests in Social Media Accounts, 40 N. KY. L. REV. 507, 511 (2013)
(“[T]here is a disturbing emergence of reports of demands by public and private employers
and academic institutions for access to users’ private social media account content.”); Chloe
Albanesius, Maryland OKs Bill Banning Employers from Requesting Passwords, PC MAG. (Apr. 10,
2012), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2402852,00.asp (noting reports emerging “of
employers asking current and prospective employees to hand over passwords or access to
services like Facebook”); Erin Egan, Protecting Your Passwords and Your Privacy, FACEBOOK (Mar.
23, 2012, 5:32 AM), https://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=326598317390057 (“In
recent months, we’ve seen a distressing increase in reports of employers or others seeking to
gain inappropriate access to people’s Facebook profiles or private information.”); Zach
Walton, SNOPA Is One Internet Bill Worth Rooting For, WEBPRONEWS (Apr. 27, 2012), http://
www.webpronews.com/snopa-is-one-internet-bill-worth-rooting-for-2012-04 (“[I]t bears
repeating just how bad of a problem this is. In short, it turns out that there’s a disturbing
trend among American employers asking for applicants’ Facebook passwords.”).
9See, e.g., Eric Gaydos, Relax—You’ll Never, Ever Be Asked for a Facebook Password, TLNT (May
15, 2012, 8:35 AM), http://www.tlnt.com/2012/05/15/relax-youll-never-ever-be-asked-for-a-
facebook-password/; Philip L. Gordon, Illinois’ New Social Media Password Law Raises Substantial
and Unjustified Obstacles to Employers’ Legitimate Business Activities, WORKPLACE PRIVACY COUNS.
(May 29, 2012), http://www.littler.com/2012/05/articles/state-privacy-laws/illinois-new-social
-media-password-law-raises-substantial-and-unjustified-obstacles-to-emplo (“Despite the
absence of a proven need, the Illinois bill imposes apparently broad restrictions on
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Trend or not, state legislatures have taken notice. After the Robert
Collins incident in Maryland caught the attention of the media and the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) (which convinced the Department of
Corrections to stop the practice),10 the Maryland General Assembly took action
and, in 2012, became the first state to enact legislation that prohibits employers
from asking for social media login information.11 Since then, sixteen more
states have passed similar statutes,12 while twenty-seven others have consid-
ered comparable legislation.13 Congress too has joined the movement,
employers.”); Jon Hyman, Ohio Joins the Fray on Employers Asking for Social Media Passwords,
OHIO EMPLOYER’s LAW BLOG (May 29, 2012), http://www.ohioemployerlawblog.com/2012/05/
ohio-joins-fray-on-employers-asking-for.html (asserting that companies are not engaging in
the type of conduct the Ohio social media password bill seeks to legislate); Elizabeth
Torphy-Donzella, Maryland Password Protection Law Takes Effect, LAB. & EMP. REP. (Oct. 10,
2012), http://www.laboremploymentreport.com/2012/10/10/maryland-password-protection-
law-takes-effect/ (“[W]hat is not apparent is that this is a widespread problem that required
legislative action.”).
10Ateqah Khaki, Status Update: Employers Asking for Your Facebook Password Violates Your Privacy
and the Privacy of All Your Friends, Too, ACLU BLOG OF RIGHTS (Mar. 22, 2012, 2:49 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty/status-update-employers-asking-your
-facebook-password-violates-your (“As soon as his job interview at the Department of Cor-
rections ended, Collins contacted the ACLU of Maryland (on his way to the car, in fact!) and
soon after, Legal Director Deborah Jeon wrote a letter to the department. . . . A few months
later, the department reconsidered its policy, and instead began asking applicants to ‘volun-
tarily’ provide access to their accounts during interviews.”).
11MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-712 (West 2012).
12ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-2-124 (West 2013); CAL. LAB. CODE § 980 (West 2013); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 8-2-127 (West 2013); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/10 (West 2012); 2014 La. Act 165 (to
be codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 51:1951–1955 (2014)); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 37.271–
278 (West 2012); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.135 (West 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:6B-5–10
(West 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4-34 (West 2013); H.B. 2372, Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2014) (to be
codified at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 173.2, 173.3 (West 2014)) (effective Nov. 1, 2014); OR.
REV. STAT. § 659A.330 (West 2014); 2014 R.I. Pub. Law S2095A (to be codified at R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 28-56-1–6 (West 2014) (effective June 30, 2014); Tenn. Pub. Act No. 2014-826
(effective Jan. 1, 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-48-101–301 (West 2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 49.44.200, 205 (West 2013); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 995.55 (West 2014). As of the time this article
went to press, New Hampshire’s legislature had passed a bill prohibiting employers from
requesting access to employees’ and prospective employees’ personal accounts, but it had not
yet been signed by the governor. See H.B. 1407, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2014).
13In 2012, according to the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), the following
states considered but did not pass legislation: Delaware, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri,
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Washington. See Employer
Access to Social Media User Names and Passwords, 2012 Legislation, NCSL, http://www.ncsl.org/
issues-research/telecom/employer-access-to-social-media-passwords.aspx (last updated Jan.
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considering five bills in the past two years, two of which are currently pend-
ing—the Password Protection Act (PPA)14 and the Social Networking Online
Protection Act (SNOPA).15 While some similarities exist, these various state and
federal pieces of legislation differ dramatically in a number of ways, including
the specific prohibited acts, the definitions of important terms such as “social
media” and “personal account,” whether exceptions or exemptions apply, and
language regarding enforcement and penalties.
This legislative development is fascinating, particularly because it
moves against the otherwise prevailing belief that employee privacy is on
the decline.16 Nonetheless, a significant number of state legislatures clearly
believe this protection is necessary, and rightly so. In a world where online
privacy is increasingly in question, these statutes are necessary to help
strike a better balance between an employer’s legitimate business interests
and the employee’s right to keep personal information private. They are
also a healthy step toward reinstating some of the privacy interests employ-
ees have lost over the years, particularly due to the development of new
workplace technology that makes monitoring and access to private infor-
mation easier.17 However, these statutes certainly have their share of
criticism, some of which is valid. Generally, those critical of the legislation
17, 2013). In 2013, eighteen states joined the list of those who considered similar legislation
but did not pass a bill: Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin. See Employer Access to Social Media User Names
and Passwords, 2013 Legislation, NCSL, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/employer-
access-to-social-media-passwords-2013.aspx#2013 (last updated Feb. 21, 2014). For pending
bills in 2014, see infra note 39.
14H.R. 2077, S. 1426, 113th Cong. (2013).
15H.R. 537, 113th Cong. (2013).
16See, e.g., Ariana R. Levinson, Carpe Diem: Privacy Protection in Employment Act, 43 AKRON L.
REV. 331, 337 (2010) (“The lack of adequate protections for employees’ right to privacy from
employer technological monitoring has been well documented by numerous scholars.”);
Robert Sprague, Orwell Was an Optimist: The Evolution of Privacy in the United States and Its
De-Evolution for American Employees, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 83, 84 (2008) (“Employees have
virtually no privacy.”); Robert Sprague, From Taylorism to the Omnipticon: Expanding Employee
Surveillance Beyond the Workplace, 25 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 34 (2007) (noting
that “[h]istorically, courts have considered employees to have minimal expectations of privacy
in the workplace”).
17See Corey A. Ciocchetti, The Eavesdropping Employer: A Twenty-First Century Framework for
Employee Monitoring, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 285, 289–90 (2011) (“Unfortunately, the American legal
system has failed to: (1) keep up with today’s powerful monitoring technology and (2) provide
the necessary privacy protection to employees.”).
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believe either that password protection is simply unnecessary or that
individual statutes are inadequate.18 Additionally, the differences from
state to state are significant enough that they will likely pose real challenges
to multistate employers as they attempt to navigate them.
These laws are so recent that no cases have yet challenged their
application. To date, only a small number of published articles have ana-
lyzed this trend, and none have introduced any model legislation.19 This
article fills that gap. It examines the current legislation, both enacted and
proposed. It argues in favor of these laws, generally, but shows that no
current statute or bill adequately balances the need for employers to
investigate and monitor job applicants and current employees while also
recognizing their privacy interests. Therefore, this article proposes model
language that should form the basis for a federal statute. In doing so, it also
adds to the call from scholars about the need for comprehensive federal
legislation to address employee Internet privacy.20
18See infra Part II.B.
19See, e.g., Jordan M. Blanke, The Legislative Response to Employers’ Requests for Password Disclo-
sure, 14 J. HIGH TECH. L. 42 (2014); Poore, supra note 8; Robert Sprague, No Surfing Allowed:
A Review and Analysis of Legislation Prohibiting Employers from Demanding Access to Employees’ and
Job Applicants’ Social Media Accounts, 24 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. (forthcoming 2014), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2390256; Timothy J. Buckley, Note, Password Protection Now: An
Elaboration on the Need for Federal Password Protection Legislation and Suggestions on How to Draft
It, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 875 (2013) (analyzing in brief six state statutes and making
general suggestions for federal legislation); Courteney B. Lario, Note, What Are You Looking
At?: Why the Private Sector’s Use of Social Media Need Not Be Legislated, 38 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.
133 (2013); Sarah N. O’Donohue, Note, “Like” It or Not, Password Protection Laws Could Protect
Much More than Passwords, 20 J.L. BUS. & ETHICS 77 (2014); Michelle Scheinman, Cyberfrontier:
New Guidelines for Employers Regarding Employee Social Media, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 731 (2013)
(examining existing law that may already prohibit asking for social media access and analyz-
ing the California statute); Rachel M. South, House Bill 117: Labor; Employees Requesting
Username, Password or Means of Accessing an Account for Purposes of Accessing Personal Social
Media; Prohibit, 6 J. MARSHALL L.J. 717 (2013) (summarizing proposed Georgia H.B. 117).
Buckley (supra) and Poore (supra note 8) include suggestions for language that appropriate
legislation should contain, but do not provide an entire model statute.
20See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 16, at 335 (“Perhaps most significantly, few, if any, academic
articles have proposed an actual draft of legislation designed to protect employees from
technological monitoring by their employers. Yet if recent calls for privacy protection to
address emerging technologies are to succeed, blueprints for legislation must be provided.”);
Laura Arredondo-Santisteban, Note, Stealing Glances: Electronic Communications Privacy and the
Necessity for New Legislation in the Digital Age, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE 205, 235 (2013),
available at http://ncjolt.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Arredondo_Final.pdf (“A uniform
federal approach should encompass the password protection statutes that have currently
784 Vol. 51 / American Business Law Journal
After this Introduction, Part I summarizes the general provisions of
the currently enacted state statutes. It includes, where appropriate, dis-
cussion of the proposed state and federal bills, particularly those that add
unique provisions. Part II discusses the necessity for this legislation to
ensure protection of employee privacy and responds to the major criti-
cisms of these laws. Part III sets forth a Proposed Act that should form the
basis of future legislation. It then explains the considerations that went
into the proposal, including how it is intended to resolve problems asso-
ciated with the current state laws.
I. CURRENT LEGISLATION
In 2012, four states—California,21 Illinois,22 Maryland,23 and Michigan24—
enacted laws that generally prohibit an employer from requiring
a job applicant or current employee to disclose a username or
password for his or her social media account.25 In 2013, eight more
states—Arkansas,26 Colorado,27 Nevada,28 New Jersey,29 New Mexico,30
been adopted by several states and expand upon those protections to include other forms of
access to stored communications. Federal legislation should act as a prohibition against all
unauthorized access, regardless of whether a password was requested or demanded for
access.”).
21CAL. LAB. CODE § 980 (West 2012).
22820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/10 (West 2012).
23MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-712 (West 2012).
24MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 37.271–278 (West 2012).
25Many of these states, such as California and Utah, also enacted provisions to prohibit
academic institutions from requiring password or login credentials from students. Although
a related topic, legislation related to academic institutions is beyond the scope of this paper.
26ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-2-124 (West 2013).
27COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-127 (West 2013).
28NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.135 (West 2013).
29N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:6B-5–10 (West 2013).
30N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4-34 (West 2013).
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Oregon,31 Utah,32 and Washington33—passed similar statutes. As of mid-
2014, Louisiana,34 Oklahoma,35 Rhode Island,36 Tennessee,37 and Wiscon-
sin38 have enacted, and a total of twenty-seven other states39 and
Congress40 have considered, similar legislation. Thus, in just the past
three years, a majority of states (forty-four) and both the U.S. House of
31OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.330 (West 2014).
32UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-48-101–301 (West 2013).
33WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.44.200, 205 (West 2013).
342014 La. Act 165 (to be codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 51:19511955 (2014)).
35H.B. 2372, Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2014) (to be codified at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 173.2, 173.3
(West 2014)) (effective Nov. 1, 2014).
362014 R.I. Pub. Law S2095A (to be codified at R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-56-1–6 (West 2014)
(effective June 30, 2014).
37WIS. STAT. ANN. § 995.55 (West 2014).
38Tenn. Pub. Act No. 2014-826 (effective Jan. 1, 2015).
39The twenty-seven states that have or are considering, but have not yet passed, legislation are
Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont,
West Virginia, and Wyoming. See Employer Access to Social Media User Names and Passwords, 2014
Legislation, NCSL, http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-
technology/employer-access-to-social-media-passwords-2013.aspx#2014 (last updated May
14, 2014). Rather than passing password protection legislation, the Vermont legislature
created a “Social Networking Privacy Protection Study Committee” whose task was to study
the issue, including laws enacted or proposed elsewhere, and make recommendations by
January, 2014. S. 7, Act 47, 2013–2014 Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2013) (codified at 21 VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 495(j) (2013)). In its January 14, 2014, report, the committee reported that its “members
did not reach consensus on the issue of social network privacy provisions, and, therefore,
were unable to make a recommendation for proposed legislation.” VT. DEP’T OF LABOR, SOCIAL
NETWORKING PRIVACY STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT (ACT 47 OF 2013), 2013–2014 Leg. Sess. (2014),
available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/reports/2014ExternalReports/296108.pdf. Similar to
Vermont, Maine voted to suspend its “social media privacy” bill, L.D. 1194, and form a
committee to “study the issues involved in social media and personal e-mail privacy with
regard to education and employment.” L.B. 1194 Amendment C-A (H-640), 126th Maine
Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Me. 2014). Wyoming’s proposed legislation, introduced February 10,
2014, met a quick end when it was indefinitely postponed on February 26. S.F. 81, 62d Leg.,
2014 Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2014).
40See supra notes 14 & 15 and accompanying text.
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Representatives and U.S. Senate have either enacted or considered enact-
ing employee password protection legislation.41
Most lawmakers in favor of the legislation claim it is necessary to
protect employee privacy. Nebraska State Senator Tyson Larson, who
introduced a bill in the Nebraska House of Representatives in 2013,
indicated that the legislation was necessary to protect individual privacy
because of the increasing popularity of social media. Noting that social
media users often take advantage of the websites’ privacy settings to limit
access to their posts, Senator Larson stated that “[i]nformation that is kept
private by an employee or applicant should remain private, and an
employer should not be entitled to access this private information just
because it is kept on the Internet.”42 Other legislators who introduced
similar legislation expressed comparable justification for their bills.43
However, while the underlying purpose of these laws is relatively the same
from state to state, and some legislators have clearly modeled their
proposed bills on earlier legislation, the statutes themselves still vary
41The six states that have not considered this issue are Alabama, Alaska, Idaho, Kentucky,
South Dakota, and Virginia.
42Hearing on LB 58 Before the Business and Labor Committee, 103d Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2013)
(Statement of Sen. Tyson Larson, Member, Sen. Comm. on Bus. and Labor).
43See David Kravets, 6 States Bar Employers from Demanding Facebook Passwords, WIRED ( Jan. 2,
2013, 2:24 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/01/password-protected-states/ (“ ‘Our
social-media accounts offer views into our personal lives and expose information that would
be inappropriate to discuss during a job interview due to the inherent risk of creating biases
in the minds of employers,’ [California Assemblywoman Nora] Campos said. ‘In order to
continue to minimize the threat of bias and discrimination in the workplace and the hiring
process, California must continue to evolve its privacy protections to keep pace with advanc-
ing technology.’ ”); Brendan Sasso, Lawmakers Seek to Bar Bosses from Asking for Facebook
Passwords, THEHILL (May 22, 2013, 4:40 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/
technology/301319-lawmakers-look-to-bar-bosses-from-asking-for-facebook-passwords
(“Without this protection, employers essentially can act as imposters and assume the identity
of an employee and continually access, monitor and even manipulate an employee’s personal
social activities and opinions.”) (quoting Rep. Ed Perlmutter (D-CO), co-sponsor of the PPA)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Bob Sullivan, EXCLUSIVE: “SNOPA” Would Ban Employ-
ers, Schools from Demanding Facebook Passwords, NBC NEWS.COM (Apr. 27, 2012, 11:37 AM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/exclusive-snopa-would-ban-employers-schools-
demanding-facebook-passwords-738965 (“We have to draw a line between what is publicly
available information, and what is personal, private content. I think we would all object to
having to turn over usernames and passwords for email accounts, or even worse, to bank
accounts. User-generated social media content should be no different.”) (quoting Rep. Eliot
Engel (D-N.Y.), who introduced SNOPA) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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significantly, which makes analysis a daunting task. Indeed, the statutes are
so diverse and numerous that a detailed discussion of each would be
unproductive and of little value.44 Therefore, this section provides a
general overview rather than an exhaustive analysis of each state statute,
primarily to introduce the general provisions and to exemplify why model
legislation would be a useful step toward uniformity. It focuses mainly on
the seventeen enacted laws rather than proposed bills, although it also
includes discussion of provisions found in proposed legislation that are
unique or upon which the Proposed Act relies. The following brief
summary of the enacted legislation and a few select bills is organized into
six broad categories: (1) the parties to whom the statutes apply, (2) the
applicable online accounts, (3) prohibited acts, (4) exemptions or excep-
tions, (5) enforcement provisions, and (6) unique provisions. The table in
Appendix A details each enacted statute and selected proposed bills. The
statutes and proposed bills that form the basis of the Proposed Act are also
discussed in more detail later in Part IV.B.
Most of the statutes apply to employers, employees, and job appli-
cants.45 Although many do not define those terms, the term “employer”
generally includes both public and private employers.46 One proposed
bill also included independent contractors within the definition of
“employee.”47
One of the more interesting and controversial differences between
the statutes relates to the type of online account or device the employer
may (or may not) access.48 Some statutes are limited only to “social
44The total number of state and federal bills, either enacted or introduced, is at least
seventy-five. This number does not include bills that were introduced but rejected in those
seventeen states that have enacted a statute, nor does it include amended bills.
45See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-127(1)(a) (West 2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
37.272(c) (West 2012). The exception is the New Mexico statute, which applies only to
prospective employees. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4-34(A) (West 2013).
46See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-2-124(a)(2) (West 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-48-102(2) (West
2013).
47See L.B. 1194, 2013 Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2013). The proposed bill does not define the
term “independent contractor.”
48Indeed, the definitions of “social media” and “personal accounts” may be the most contro-
versial portions of these statutes, beyond, of course, their very existence. The concept of
“ownership” of social media or online accounts is an emerging issue in employment law. See
infra text accompanying notes 122–134.
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networking website”49 while others extend more broadly to some variation
of the term “online personal account.”50 Of those that do define the
relevant terms (some do not), the definitions themselves are often strik-
ingly different. For example, consider the difference between the Michi-
gan and Utah statutes. Michigan defines a “personal internet account” as
one that is “created via a bounded system established by an internet-based
service that requires a user to input or store access information via an
electronic device to view, create, utilize, or edit the user’s account infor-
mation, profile, display, communications, or stored data.”51 Notably,
however, this definition does not make clear why the account is personal to
the user, nor does the statute refer elsewhere to a “nonpersonal account”
from which one might infer the meaning of the term “personal.” On the
other hand, Utah illuminates the personal nature of the accounts to which
its law refers by defining a “Personal Internet account” as an “online
account that is used by an employee or applicant exclusively for personal
communications unrelated to any business purpose of the employer.”52
Statutes that cover either social media or personal online accounts can be
differentiated from those that focus more upon the type of device through
which such accounts might be accessed. For instance, the Colorado statute
prohibits employers from asking for access to a personal account or service
“through the employee’s or applicant’s electronic communications
device.”53 Given this variety, clearly the applicable mediums or devices
contemplated by these laws are far from uniform.
49See, e.g., 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/10(b)(1) (West 2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4-34(E).
50See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-127(2)(a); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.272(d).
51MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.272(d).
52UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-48-102(4)(a) (West 2013); see also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 995.55(1)(d) (West
2014). Compare also 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 55/10(b)(4)(A)–(C) (defining “social networking
website” as an “Internet-based service that allows individuals to: (A) construct a public or
semi-public profile within a bounded system, created by the service; (B) create a list of other
users with whom they share a connection within the system; and (C) view and navigate their
list of connections and those made by others within the system”), with CAL. LAB. CODE § 980(a)
(West 2012) (defining “social media” as an “electronic service or account, or electronic
content, including but not limited to, videos, still photographs, blogs, video blogs, podcasts,
instant and text messages, email, online services or accounts, or Internet Web site profiles or
locations”).
53COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-127(2)(a). See also MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-712(a)(3)(i)
(West 2012) (defining “Electronic communications device” as including “computers, tele-
phones, personal digital assistants, and other similar devices”).
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The statutes are most consistent regarding the acts the laws prohibit.
Each of the statutes and bills essentially prohibits employers from requir-
ing a job applicant or employee to disclose or provide a username,
password, or other login credentials that would allow access to the appli-
cant’s or employee’s social media or personal online account.54 A few go
further and prohibit indirect access such as observation of the account in
the presence of the employee55 (sometimes referred to as “shoulder
surfing”56), changing privacy settings to allow public observation of the
profile’s contents,57 or adding the employer or an agent to the employee’s
or applicant’s contact list.58 A majority of the enacted statutes also prohibit
retaliation against employees or job applicants who refuse to provide the
employer with requested login credentials.59
Summarizing the many different exceptions found within the statutes
and proposed bills is a difficult task because they vary considerably,
ranging from those statutes that have only a few exceptions60 to a much
broader framework of exemptions.61 Exceptions generally include
provisions that allow employers to investigate workplace misconduct62
and possible misappropriation of proprietary, confidential, or financial
54See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 980(b)(1); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.135(1)(a) (West 2013); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 49.44.200(1)(a) (West 2013).
55See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.330(1)(c) (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
49.44.200(1)(b); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 995.55(2)(a)(1).
56The term “shoulder surfing” generally applies to a person who observes a computer user to
obtain information, often without the user’s knowledge or consent. See Shoulder Surfing,
TECHOPEDIA, http://www.techopedia.com/definition/4103/shoulder-surfing (last visited May 26,
2014) (“Shoulder surfing refers to the act of obtaining personal or private information
through direct observation.”); shoulder surfing, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://oxforddictionaries
.com/us/definition/american_english/shoulder-surfing (last visited May 26, 2014) (“The prac-
tice of spying on the user of an ATM, computer, or other electronic device in order to obtain
their personal access information.”).
57See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-2-124(b)(1)(C) (West 2013).
58See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.330(1)(b).
59See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 980(e); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-127(3)(a) & (b) (West 2013).
60See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-4-34(B)(1)–(2), (C) & (D) (West 2013).
61See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-48-201 (West 2013).
62See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-2-124(e)(2)(A).
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information.63 Many statutes also allow employers to search for informa-
tion about employees or applicants available in the public domain64 and to
ask for login information necessary to access the employer’s own networks
and equipment.65 The Wisconsin statute allows an employer to request or
require an employee to disclose the employee’s personal e-mail address.66
The laws continue to differ significantly regarding enforcement pro-
visions and penalties. Some statutes simply do not address enforcement or
possible remedies at all.67 Others provide for only a civil remedy,68 while
Michigan alone allows for both a civil remedy and criminal enforcement.69
The available damages range from no dollar amount indicated,70 to $500
in Utah and Washington,71 $1,000 in Michigan and New Jersey,72 all the
way up to $10,000 in SNOPA and one proposed bill.73 Legislation in
Colorado and Wisconsin, SNOPA, and a proposed bill in Connecticut
place enforcement responsibilities on administrative agencies,74 while,
63See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.275(1)(b)–(c) (West 2012).
64See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-2-124(d).
65See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.135(2) (West 2013).
66WIS. STAT. ANN. § 995.55(2)(b)(7) (West 2014).
67Statutes in the following states do not contain a penalty provision: Arkansas, California,
Illinois, Nevada, New Mexico, and Oregon.
68See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-48-301 (West 2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.44.205 (West
2013).
69See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.278 (West 2012).
70See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-712(f) (West 2012); 2014 R.I. Pub. Law S2095A (to be
codified at R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-56-6 (West 2014) (effective June 30, 2014). Several
proposed bills provide for a civil penalty but do not specify a dollar amount. See, e.g., North
Carolina (H.B. 846, 2013); New Hampshire (H.B. 1407, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2014));
Nebraska (L.B. 58, 103d Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2013) and H.B. 1455, 103d Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb.
2013)).
71UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-48-301(2); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.44.205(1).
72MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.278(2); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:6B-9 (West 2013). The New Jersey
law awards $2,500 for each subsequent violation. Id. Colorado also increases the penalty, to
$5,000, for each subsequent violation. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-127(5) (West 2013).
73See H.R. 537(b)(1)(A), 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); S.B. 159, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess.
(Conn. 2013).
74See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-127(5) (providing that claims shall be filed with the state
department of labor and employment); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 995.55(6)(b) (West 2014) (allowing
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conversely, at least one other state bill intentionally excludes enforcement
obligations from the relevant agency.75
A handful of unique provisions found in particular statutes or bills
are worth mentioning. Placement of these laws within the state code is
widely varied; some laws are found in an entirely new act,76 while others
amend or add to existing labor statutes.77 New Jersey is the first enacted
law that expressly prohibits the employer from asking an employee or
applicant to waive protection provided by the law; it also provides that any
agreements to waive the provisions are unenforceable.78 The recently
enacted statute in Louisiana does not prohibit an employee or applicant
from “self-disclosing” username or password information that allows the
employer to access a personal online account.79 Some state laws specifically
provide that the laws do not create a duty to search or monitor employee
Internet use through personal accounts, nor will employers be liable for
failure to do so.80 On the other hand, other statutes state that their
an employee or applicant to file a complaint with the department of workforce development);
H.R. 537(b)(1)(B) (placing enforcement responsibility on the U.S. Secretary of Labor); S.B.
159 (requiring the Connecticut Attorney General to file a claim for violation of the law in
Superior Court).
75See CAL. LAB. CODE § 980, Sec. 2 of Stats. 2012, c. 618 (A.B. 1844) (West 2012) (“[T]he Labor
Commissioner, who is Chief of the Division of Labor standards enforcement, is not required
to investigate or determine any violation of this act.”).
76See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-48-101 (creating the “Internet Employment Privacy Act”).
77See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 980; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4-34 (West 2013) (amending existing
Article 4 “Labor Conditions; Payment of Wages”).
78N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:6B-7 (West 2013) (“No employer shall require an individual to waive or
limit any protection granted under this act as a condition of applying for or receiving an offer
of employment. An agreement to waive any right or protection under this Act is against the
public policy of this State and is void and unenforceable.”). See also H.B. 1455, 103d Leg., 1st
Sess. (Neb. 2013); L.B. 58, 103d Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2013).
79See 2014 La. Act 165 (to be codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 51:1953(G) (2014)).
80See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.277(1) (West 2012) (“This act does not create a duty for
an employer . . . to search or monitor the activity of a personal internet account.”); id. §
37.277(2) (“An employer . . . is not liable under this act for failure to request or require that
an employee. . . [or] an applicant for employment. . . grant access to, allow observation of, or
disclose information that allows access to or observation of the employee’s. . . [or] applicant
for employment’s. . . personal internet account.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-48-203(1)–(2); see also
OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.330(3) (West 2014) (providing that “[a]n employer may not be held
liable for the failure to request or require an employee or applicant to disclose the informa-
tion specified” in the act).
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provisions are not intended to hinder any other legal duty to conduct
Internet searches on employees or job applicants.81
This concludes a broad summary of the legislation relating to an
employer’s access to employees’ and applicant’s social media and online
accounts, both enacted and proposed. The Proposed Act incorporates
many of the provisions discussed in this section, as is explained more fully
in Part III below. However, before considering the Proposed Act, this
article first considers why this legislation is important. It also addresses and
responds to critics of the laws.
II. THE NEED FOR BALANCED, COMPREHENSIVE
LEGISLATION TO PROTECT INTERNET
PRIVACY RIGHTS
Clearly, employers have a legitimate interest in gaining information about
employees and job applicants. Employers monitor employees’ and job
applicants’ online behavior to learn about their character, personality
traits, and interests that may have bearing on their ability to do the job.82
Employers also have compelling business reasons to pay attention to
current employees’ productivity, work performance, and possible
security violations.83 Moreover, “[f]ailure to uncover an obvious flaw in an
employee’s background or character could lead to negligent hiring and
negligent retention lawsuits or malpractice claims having serious business
81See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.275(2) (providing that the “act does not prohibit or
restrict an employer from complying with a duty to screen employees or applicants prior to
hiring or to monitor or retain employee communications that is established under federal law
or by a self-regulatory organization”).
82See Patricia Sánchez Abril et al., Blurred Boundaries: Social Media Privacy and the Twenty-First-
Century Employee, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 63, 69–70 (2012).
83See id. at 70; see also Michael Z. Green, Against Employer Dumpster-Diving for Email, 64 S.C. L.
REV. 323, 335 (2012) (“[E]mployers have legitimate reasons to want information about their
employees, including the need to address concerns about harassment, theft, protection of
trade secrets, and efficient performance of duties. Sometimes employers may need to inves-
tigate and review an employee’s ESI [electronically stored information] either as part of the
employer’s duties to act responsibly under law or as an attempt to protect itself in litigation.”)
(footnote omitted); Robert Sprague, Invasion of the Social Networks: Blurring the Line Between
Personal Life and the Employment Relationship, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 1, 7–9 (2011) (discussing
various potential legal liabilities employers may face for not properly vetting job candidates).
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repercussions.”84 However, despite these reasonable concerns, intrusions
into employee privacy can also damage employee morale and the employ-
ment relationship,85 a reality employers may often ignore.86 Further,
although employees generally accept that they will be monitored at work,
research indicates that few of those applicants believe their online infor-
mation will have an impact on a decision to hire them.87 Young people in
particular “still cling to certain expectations of privacy in the workplace.”88
This is hardly surprising, given how the right to privacy has ebbed in
recent years.89
84Abril et al., supra note 82, at 70 (footnotes omitted).
85Id. at 69 (“A considerable body of business research indicates that employer invasiveness
may lead to higher levels of employee stress, lower levels of productivity, and worse employee
health and morale.”); Ciocchetti, supra note 17, at 286–87 (“[E]mployee monitoring pierces
the veil of an individual’s privacy and can decrease morale.”).
86See John Soma et al., Bit-Wise but Privacy Foolish: Smarter E-Messaging Technologies Call for a
Return to Core Privacy Principles, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 487, 493 (2010) (noting “there is
increasing evidence that employers often ignore the adverse consequences to employee
morale and occupational health” arising from surveillance technologies) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
87Kabrina K. Chang, All Up in Your Facebook: Using Social Media to Screen Job Applicants, 47 NEW
ENG. L. REV. ON REMAND 1, 2 (2012), available at http://newenglrev.com/on-remand-2/volume-
47-on-remand/chang-all-up-in-your-facebook/ (citing a 2009 study in which only nine
percent of those surveyed believed employers would make hiring decisions based upon their
online activity); see also Jean M. Roche, Note, Why Can’t We Be Friends?: Why California Needs
a Lifestyle Discrimination Statute to Protect Employees from Employment Actions Based on Their
Off-Duty Behavior, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 187, 190–91 (2011).
88Abril et al., supra note 82, at 73.
Millennials seem to take for granted that their work and personal lives do not intersect
and that their actions in one should not affect the other, as marked by their overwhelm-
ing belief that an employee’s conduct outside the office should not be used as a basis for
making promotion determinations. Their objection to this increasingly common prac-
tice reflects an expectation that they would not be discriminated against on the basis of
their online identities.
Id. at 108 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted); see also Allyson W. Haynes, Virtual Blinds:
Finding Online Privacy in Offline Precedents, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 603, 642 (2012).
89See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 16; see also Lothar Determann & Robert Sprague,
Intrusive Monitoring: Employee Privacy Expectations Are Reasonable in Europe, Destroyed in the
United States, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 979, 1018 (2011) (“[E]mployees should anticipate very
minimal expectations of privacy in workplaces within the United States.”); Pauline T. Kim,
Electronic Privacy and Employee Speech, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 901, 903 (2012) (“[M]any com-
mentators have argued that employee privacy is insufficiently protected in the electronic
workplace.”).
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A wide variety of interested parties, including scholars, practitioners,
courts, and legislatures, have deliberated over where the appropriate line
between these two competing interests should be drawn. Whether and to
what degree employees and job applicants have, or should have, any
expectation of privacy regarding their online accounts is a “vexing” con-
temporary question,90 indicating that the rights of both employers and
employees are far from clear.91 Although many scholars acknowledge that
the privacy pendulum has swung in favor of employers, “[t]he extent to
which the law should intervene in the employment relationship to protect
employee privacy is highly contested.”92 Passage of legislation that prohib-
its unwarranted intrusion into employees’ and job applicants’ personal
online accounts helps answer this vexing question regarding employee
Internet privacy. It is an important and necessary step toward providing
both employers and employees with clearer boundaries regarding what is,
and is not, acceptable at work. From a broader perspective, this legislation
will also be a useful tool upon which courts can rely as they attempt to
clarify privacy interests in social media and other online accounts.
A. Password Protection Legislation Clarifies the Law Regarding Employee
Internet Privacy
When considering whether employees and applicants have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their personal online accounts, one must first
acknowledge that most social media websites allow users to communicate
in a number of ways. A person’s “digital footprint” usually contains far
more than simply posts made on a page that are visible to every one of that
person’s contacts and to the public. A social media profile in particular is
often a highly personal record of that user’s life, related to activities the
90Zoe Argento, Whose Social Network Account? A Trade Secret Approach to Allocating Rights, 19
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 201, 235 (2013).
91See Francois Quintin Cilliers, The Role and Effects of Social Media in the Workplace, 40 N. KY.
L. REV. 567, 568–69 (2013) (“The lack of statutes and regulations regarding the usage of
social media in the hiring process creates uncertainty for employers and employees.”); Kim,
supra note 89, at 902 (“[T]he norms surrounding whether or when employees can expect
privacy in their communications are highly uncertain.”); Nancy B. Schess, Then and Now: How
Technology Has Changed the Workplace, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 435, 452 (2013) (“Uncer-
tainty in the law is particularly evident in the context of employee use of social media.”).
92Kim, supra note 89, at 903 (emphasis omitted).
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user engages in outside of work, much of which can be kept private from
the viewing public. Users who are connected to each other in social media
platforms such as Facebook and LinkedIn may communicate via private
messages, which are akin to e-mail.93 They may also share information by
posting on their own “walls” or profile pages, but those posts are not
necessarily available to the public or even to the user’s entire contact list.94
Facebook, for instance, provides a multitude of privacy options that allow
users to select a specific audience for posted content. These selections
include visibility to only the user, to one or a few of the user’s friends, to
only the user’s entire friend list, or to the public.95 Employers who have
unfettered access to employees’ or applicants’ social media profiles that
contain any combination of the above are likely to intrude into personal,
off-work areas of the employees’ or applicants’ lives where, arguably, they
have a reasonable expectation of privacy.96 However, given the variety of
methods by which users can communicate with each other on social media
websites, the question then becomes where specifically that reasonable
expectation of privacy begins and ends. May a user expect privacy in
private messages? In public posts? In posts made viewable to only a few
users? Although we can look to analogous areas of law for guidance,
answers to these questions remain murky at best. Piecemeal application of
existing law to social media creates a quagmire employers may be unlikely
to negotiate well.
93See infra text accompanying notes 97–104.
94Buckley, supra note 19, at 877 (“The configuration of social media websites typically permits
users to choose between various methods of communication to interact. These choices enable
users to dictate the parameters of their audiences.”).
95See Facebook Basic Privacy Settings & Tools, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/
325807937506242 (last visited May 26, 2014).
96Many scholars and commentators have argued that employees have, or should have, a
reasonable expectation of privacy regarding their off-work activities. See, e.g., Marisa Anne
Pagnatarro, What Do You Do When You Are Not at Work?: Limiting the Use of Off-Duty Conduct as
the Basis for Adverse Employment Decisions, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 625, 629–77 (2004); Jason
Bosch, Note, None of Your Business (Interest): The Argument for Protecting All Employee Behavior
with No Business Impact, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 639, 660 (2003); Shelbie J. Byers, Note, Untangling
the World Wide Weblog: A Proposal for Blogging, Employment-At-Will, and Lifestyle Discrimination
Statutes, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 245, 255 (2007); Joseph Lipps, Note, State Lifestyle Statutes and the
Blogosphere: Autonomy for Private Employees in the Internet Age, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 645, 685 (2011);
Ann L. Rives, Note, You’re Not the Boss of Me: A Call for Federal Lifestyle Discrimination Legislation,
74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 553, 568 (2006); Roche, supra note 87, at 190–91.
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Private messages sent between social media users are the functional
equivalent of private e-mail from personal accounts,97 in which several
recent cases have held that users generally have a reasonable expectation
of privacy. In Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc.,98 the New Jersey Supreme
Court found that an employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
e-mails she exchanged with her attorney and accessed through a work
computer because she took precautions to ensure her privacy, even though
the company notified employees of its policy that their personal e-mail
messages accessed through company equipment would not be private. The
court noted, in particular, that Stengart had used a personal, password-
protected e-mail account instead of her company e-mail address.99
The District Court for the Southern District of New York reached a
similar holding in Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp100
involving an employer who opened and printed several e-mails from a
former employee’s personal account, using password information the
employee had stored on his work computer. Concluding that the employer
violated the Stored Communications Act101 (SCA) by accessing the employ-
ee’s online account without authorization, the court found that the
employee “had a subjective belief that his personal e-mail accounts, stored
on third-party computer systems, protected (albeit ineffectively) by pass-
words, would be private.”102
97See Allen D. Hankins, Compelling Disclosure of Facebook Content Under the Stored Communications
Act, 17 SUFFOLK. J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 295, 315 (2012) (“Private messaging on Facebook
functions very similarly to web-based e-mail.”); Ryan A. Ward, Note, Discovering Facebook:
Social Network Subpoenas and the Stored Communications Act, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 563, 571–72
(2011).
98990 A.2d 650 (N.J. 2010).
99Id. at 663 (concluding plaintiff had a subjective expectation of privacy in her e-mail
messages).
100587 F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
101Pub. L. No. 99-508, tit. II, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2701–11 (2012)). The SCA comprises Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act (ECPA), which itself was an amendment to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, 82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968).
102Pure Power Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 561. The court further concluded the employee’s
privacy expectation was reasonable because nothing in the employer’s e-mail policy indicated
it would extend beyond the employer’s systems or the employment relationship; nor had the
policy been clearly communicated to the employees. Id.
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Another case considered whether the SCA applies to private mes-
sages sent via social networking. In Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., the
District Court for the Central District of California held there “is no basis
for distinguishing between . . . Facebook’s and MySpace’s private messag-
ing, on the one hand, and traditional web-based email on the other.”103 As
such, the Crispin court found that the SCA did apply to the private mes-
sages at issue in the case, thus limiting the defendant’s right to access those
communications via subpoena.104
Although these cases support employee privacy in private social
media messages, they may be limited. For example, at least one practitio-
ner points out that Stengart’s precedent is “narrow” because it relied in part
on the fact that the communication in question was privileged since it
involved correspondence with an attorney, which will not be a factor in
most situations in which employees conduct personal business on work
computers. “As a result, Stengart v. Loving Care is a fig leaf precedent: it
provides slight but valuable protection of something superlatively private
and leaves everything else exposed.”105 Additionally, at least one other
court has reached a conclusion opposite to the Stengart and Pure Power Boot
Camp decisions. In an unpublished opinion, the Texas Court of Appeals
rejected an employee’s tort claim of invasion of privacy based on intrusion
upon seclusion.106 The court held that the employee had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in items stored on the employer’s computer, even
though password protected, because the information was transmitted over
the employer’s network and accessible by the employer.107 Also, even
103717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 981–82 (C.D. Cal 2010). The court also “differentiated between read
and unread private messages, holding that they are protected in different ways under the
SCA.” Ward, supra note 97, at 571. This technical difference between read and unread e-mail
messages contributes to the problems related to applying the SCA to employer requests for
password information. See infra text accompanying notes 173–177.
104Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 991.
105Brent A. Crossrow, The Fig Leaf Precedent Set by Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 10
BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS—TECHNOLOGY LAW, no. 2, 2010, available at http://www.laborlawyers
.com/files/25559_the%20fig%20leaf%20precedent%20set%20by%20ste.pdf.
106McLaren v. Microsoft Corp., No. 05-97-00824-CV, 1999 WL 339015 (Tex. Ct. App. May 28,
1999).
107Id. at *4. See also Holmes v. Petrovich Dev. Co., 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 878 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)
(holding employee had no expectation of privacy in e-mails sent to her attorney through the
employer’s computer system).
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assuming the employee did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
content in question, the court found that the employer’s interception
of it was not a highly offensive invasion because of the employer’s
legitimate interest in preventing illegal and unprofessional activity on its
equipment.108
Accordingly, an employee or applicant might have a persuasive argu-
ment that an employer who asks for a password to an online social media
account may not access private messages within the employee’s or appli-
cant’s profile, at least absent an explicit policy that notifies employees that
the employer may do this.109 However, users usually communicate on the
main page of their online profiles as well. Some of those posts may be set
for public viewing. Others might be limited to only the user’s contacts,
perhaps even just a few of them. Would the expectation of privacy in
personal e-mail messages as contemplated in Stengart, Pure Power Boot
Camp, and Crispin extend to these wall posts as well? The answer to this
question is important because an employer who requires access to a per-
sonal social media profile will see these posts directly upon logging in.
Some commentators have advanced the argument that those who
make an effort to protect the privacy of their online accounts should be
able to expect some reasonable expectation of privacy in that content.
“Reliance on protections such as individual computer accounts, password
protection, and perhaps encryption of data should be no less reasonable
than reliance upon locks, bolts, and burglar alarms, even though each
form of protection is penetrable.”110 “This reasoning would provide a
greater expectation of privacy in password-protected or limited-access
social networking profiles.”111
Until recently, this approach to privacy was just barely reflected in
case law. “[C]ourts have given little privacy protection to postings on an
internet forum or chat room, or to other information posted to a
108McLaren, 1999 WL 339015 at *5; see also Green, supra note 83, at 344–45.
109See Determann & Sprague, supra note 89, at 1018 (“[C]ourts, particularly the U.S. Supreme
Court, have shied away from acknowledging a core privacy right that employers cannot
destroy by way of notice.”).
110Randolph S. Sergent, Note, A Fourth Amendment Model for Computer Networks and Data
Privacy, 81 VA. L. REV. 1181, 1200 (1995).
111Bryce Clayton Newell, Rethinking Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in Online Social Networks,
17 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 1, 35 (2011); see also Haynes, supra note 88, at 641 (“[P]rivacy settings
are on the rise, and courts should give them effect.”).
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website.”112 Considering whether an employer improperly invaded an
employee’s privacy by accessing her private Facebook posts without autho-
rization, the New Jersey District Court, in Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hos-
pital Service Corp. (Ehling I), noted some consistency in case law at two ends
of the privacy spectrum: no reasonable expectation of privacy for material
posted to an unprotected website, in contrast to a reasonable expectation
of privacy for individual, password-protected communications.113 The
Ehling I court noted, however, that courts have yet to develop a coherent
approach between these two extremes.114
Although not quite the “coherent approach” contemplated in Ehling
I, emerging case law supports an argument that social media users who
attempt to safeguard the privacy of their profiles should enjoy some
corresponding right to privacy. In what will undoubtedly be an important
holding in social media law, in the next iteration of the Ehling case, Ehling
II, the court put itself squarely at “one end of the spectrum,” finding that
the plaintiff’s “non-public Facebook wall posts” were private and therefore
covered by the SCA because she “chose privacy settings that limited access
to her Facebook wall to only her Facebook friends.”115 Another oft-cited
case involving employer access to password-protected electronic commu-
nications, Pietrylo v. Hillstone Restaurant Group,116 also suggests that, at least
in certain circumstances, courts will uphold a reasonable expectation of
privacy in password-protected electronic content. In Pietrylo, a group of
restaurant employees created and participated in a private MySpace chat
group related to the restaurant and its managers. When one manager
112Haynes, supra note 88, at 638 (footnote omitted).
113872 F. Supp. 2d 369, 373 (D.N.J. 2012).
114Id.
115Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hosp. Serv. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 659, 669 (D.N.J. 2013). In
Ehling II, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s common law privacy claim because the evidence
showed that the defendants were the passive recipients of information that they did not seek
out or ask for. Id. at 674 (“Plaintiff voluntarily gave information to her Facebook friend, and
her Facebook friend voluntarily gave that information to someone else.”). The District Court
for the Central District of California suggests that a Facebook user who limits access to wall
posts might also expect some privacy in that content, although it did not rule definitively on
the issue because the evidentiary record did not reveal the extent to which the plaintiff had
relied on Facebook privacy settings. See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d
965, 991 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
116No. 06–5754 (FSH), 2009 WL 3128420 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2009).
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learned of the MySpace group, he asked an employee with access for her
login information so management could view it directly. The court upheld
the jury’s verdict that this behavior violated the SCA because the employee
was coerced into providing the information, given her employment
relationship.117
Despite some courts finding privacy protection in restricted-access
communications, password protection legislation is still necessary. Social
media websites allow users to communicate via private messages, which
may afford those users some privacy in the content. In between those and
posts set for public viewing is a wide variety of semiprivate content, about
which the law is vague. An employer who obtains the applicant’s or
employee’s login credentials will see any or all of this content, some of
which the law may prohibit. But it may not.118 Although persuasive and
favorable, those cases that apply to private online communications will not
be applicable to employees in all states anytime soon. Some of those cases
may also be distinguishable based upon their unique facts. Federal pass-
word legislation would send a clear and positive message regarding
employee privacy in private social media content and would be uniformly
applicable to employees across the country.
The privacy interests at issue when employers ask for access into
personal online accounts do not end with employees and job applicants
either. Employers who gain entrance to an applicant’s or employee’s
privacy-protected social media profile also have an opportunity to see
private thoughts and content posted by others with whom the applicant or
employee interacts.119 These concerns, not to mention general online
117Id. at *3. See also infra text accompanying notes 160–179 (comparing SCA with social media
access legislation).
118See Ward, supra note 97, at 576 (“Assuming other courts follow the approach laid out in
Crispin, there are still many open questions about the SCA’s applicability to social network
content that is not inherently private. Most obviously, the Crispin court fails to give any real
guidance on the precise requirement for SCA protection of Wall posts and other non-private
message content. Must content be limited to a certain number of friends? Does content still
fall under the SCA if your friends’ friends can view it?”).
119Argento, supra note 90, at 237 (“Private communications from members of the account
holder’s network to the account holder may also deserve protection. . . . For example, if a
‘friend’ on Facebook sends a private message to me through Facebook, it seems that the
‘friend’s’ reasonable expectation of privacy in that message should be protected, perhaps not
from me, but from unauthorized intrusions by others.”); see also Garber, supra note 4 (“Snoop-
ing in someone’s Facebook profile . . . implicates one’s family and friends.”).
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etiquette,120 suggest that both job applicants and employees and the people
with whom they interact on their profile have privacy interests that should
be protected. Also, much of the proposed legislation extends to other
online accounts, including personal e-mail, banking, and other financial
online accounts. It could even apply to online accounts related to medical
records. Any of these accounts contain highly personal information, which
makes the necessity for this legislation even more pronounced. The private
material an employee or applicant maintains online should be no less off
limits than any other nondigital content such as personal letters, diaries,
bank statements, and medical records. Contrary to what opponents of the
legislation contend,121 employers have no business justification for viewing
the entire contents of these types of accounts, social media or otherwise. To
be blunt, much of this information accessible through these accounts is
simply none of the employer’s business. Without specific legislation to
prohibit access to these potentially sensitive accounts, at least some
employers may be tempted to gain access by requiring it.
In addition to clarifying the boundaries of privacy in employees’ and
job applicants’ personal online accounts, the Proposed Act will provide
needed guidance to employers and courts regarding the related, emerging
issue of “ownership” of online accounts that employees use both profes-
sionally and personally. Two recent cases, PhoneDog v. Kravitz122 and Eagle
v. Morgan,123 are illustrative of the issues that arise when employees use
social media accounts for both personal and work-related reasons. Each
case involved a dispute over rights to a social media account, and the
important contacts associated with it, when an employee left the firm.
PhoneDog involved the ownership of a former employee’s Twitter
account. When Noah Kravitz left his employment at PhoneDog, he
changed the name of his work-related Twitter account from
“@PhoneDog_Noah” to “@noahkravitz” and continued to tweet to all of
120Senators Call for Federal Probe over Employers Asking for Facebook Passwords, FOX NEWS (Mar.
25, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/03/25/senators-call-for-federal-probe-over
-employers-asking-for-facebook-passwords/ (“Not sharing passwords is a basic tenet of online
conduct. Aside from the privacy concerns, Facebook considers the practice a security risk.”).
121See infra text accompanying notes 136–150.
122No. C 11–03474 MEJ, 2011 WL 5415612 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011).
123No. 11–4303, 2013 WL 943350 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2013).
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the 17,000 followers he had attracted while employed at PhoneDog.124 In
PhoneDog’s subsequent lawsuit against him for misappropriation of trade
secrets, conversion, and intentional and negligent interference with pro-
spective economic advantage, Kravitz defended the complaint by claiming
that he established the account and password himself, and that he was
entitled to it according to Twitter’s terms of service. He also claimed that he
had no employment agreement with PhoneDog that expressly provided
that the account belonged to PhoneDog. The trial court refused to dismiss
the case for failure to state a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets
and conversion, finding that PhoneDog had made a significant claim that
it owned or at least had the right to possess the account.125 The case
ultimately settled out of court.126
In Eagle v. Morgan, the plaintiff, a high-level executive at Edcomm,
created and maintained a LinkedIn account that she used for both pro-
fessional and personal purposes. When the company was sold, Edcomm
terminated and replaced the plaintiff. It also accessed her LinkedIn
account, changed the password, and replaced her name and photograph
with that of her replacement.127 Although she regained control of her
account approximately one month later, the plaintiff sued Edcomm, alleg-
ing, among other claims, invasion of privacy, identity misappropriation,
conversion, and interference with contract. Although the court held in her
favor on several claims, it ultimately found that she had failed to prove
damages.128 The court did not directly address the question of how to
determine access rights to online accounts such as the LinkedIn account at
issue in the case, which was used for both personal and professional
124PhoneDog, 2011 WL 5415612, at *1.
125Id. at *7–9. The court granted Kravitz’s motion to dismiss PhoneDog’s claims for inten-
tional and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage. Id. at *9.
126Daniel Terdiman, Curious Case of Lawsuit over Value of Twitter Followers Is Settled, CNET (Dec.
3, 2012), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57556918-93/curious-case-of-lawsuit-over-value-
of-twitter-followers-is-settled/. Although the details of the settlement are confidential, both
parties confirmed that Kravitz retained sole ownership of the Twitter account. Id.
127Eagle, 2013 WL 943350, at *3.
128Id. at *17; see also Jessica Mendelson, Court Issues Decision in Eagle v. Morgan: Employee Owns
LinkedIn Account but Fails to Recover Any Damages Against Former Employer, TRADE SECRETS (Apr.
3, 2013), http://www.tradesecretslaw.com/2013/04/articles/trade-secrets/court-issues-decision
-in-eagle-v-morgan-employee-owns-linkedin-account-but-fails-to-recover-any-damages
-against-former-employer/.
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purposes, other than noting its disagreement with Edcomm’s claim that it
“owned” the LinkedIn account in question because “the LinkedIn User
Agreement clearly indicated that the individual user owned the
account.”129
Although these cases do not provide a definitive holding that clarifies
when an online account is personal rather than work related, they do
indicate that courts are grappling with the issue and appear to be willing
to consider a claim that employers have no right to access personal
accounts, even those that are sometimes used for work-related purposes.130
A few of the state statutes acknowledge the difference between personal
and nonpersonal accounts (although the language used in some of those
statutes is problematic),131 but a majority of the statutes do not address this
issue.132 Because the issue of ownership helps determine the right of access
to online accounts generally,133 legislative attention to the concept of
129Eagle, 2013 WL 943350, at *11. See also, Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp., Ltd.,
2014 WL 812401, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2014) (holding there was an issue of fact
regarding whether an employer accessed an employee’s Facebook and Twitter accounts, used
personally and for occasional business purposes, without authorization in violation of the
SCA).
130Although employers could avoid disputes such as those in PhoneDog and Eagle by imple-
menting and enforcing clear social media policies, inevitably some will not. See Argento, supra
note 90, at 227 (“[T]he recent spate of cases involving disputes over rights to social network
accounts is likely a harbinger of many disputes to come. . . . However, without express
agreements in place, disputes over rights to an account are inevitable.”).
131See infra text accompanying notes 217–223.
132See supra text accompanying notes 48–52.
133See JULIE E. JUDISH ET AL., DRAWING THE LINE ONLINE: EMPLOYERS’ RIGHTS TO EMPLOYEES’ SOCIAL
MEDIA ACCOUNTS 2 (2012), www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/Publications/AlertOctober2012
Litigation_DrawingtheLineOnline_EmployersRightstoEmployeesSocialMediaAccounts.pdf
(“A common theme connects the Eagle case with the recent password access legislation:
the importance of defining the lines of ownership and demarcating the boundary
between the professional and the personal. If Edcomm, for example, had established a
LinkedIn account for its CEO’s use and had asserted its property interest in the account
at the outset of the employment relationship, Edcomm’s CEO would have had no reasonable
expectation of ownership in it. Under that scenario, Edcomm likely would not be
facing trial on a misappropriation claim. Similarly, the social media password legislation
definitively declares that employers and prospective employers have no right to access the
social media accounts that applicants and employees have established for their personal
use.”).
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personal versus nonpersonal accounts will help courts decide these cases in
the future. It may even help courts resolve issues regarding ownership of
work-related electronic devices.134
B. Current Law Is Insufficient to Protect Employee Internet Privacy: A Response
to Critics
Critics of the social media access laws, many of whom are employment law
attorneys, question the necessity for the legislation.135 One claim is that
because the practice of asking for password or login information is
“deplorable,” few employers are likely to engage in it.136 Others argue that
the current statutes simply go too far by either limiting employers in the
exercise of their legitimate rights or granting employees more privacy than
the law otherwise recognizes.137 Finally, many claim that the legislation is
unnecessary because the practice violates the websites’ terms of service138
134See, e.g., Soma et al., supra note 86, at 503 (“The trend towards using mobile devices,
especially in professional ranks, is further complicated by device ownership issues.
If the employer owns the device, then it can reasonably be assumed to be a part of the
employer’s computer systems. But what if an employee uses her own device to access her
employer’s systems? Does her expectation of privacy change if she is reimbursed by
her employer for the e-messaging services that she uses to meet her work obligations?
What if employer policies address personal device usage? What if they do not? These
technology convergence and device ownership issues create a series of competing interests
and call for a more integrated view of e-messaging by all cultural stakeholders including
the law. Moreover, these issues only grow thornier as Americans’ online communications
increase, and the lines between home and the workplace continue to blur.”) (footnote
omitted).
135See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 9 (“Remarkably, the Illinois bill (like the Maryland law)
contains no legislative findings supporting the need for the law.”) (emphasis in original);
Hyman, supra note 9 (“I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again, this is not a problem that needs
fixing.”); Torphy-Donzella, supra note 9 (“What is remarkable is how little evidence there is
that employers have actually requested or required applicants or employees to disclose this
personal information as a condition of employment.”).
136See Gaydos, supra note 9.
137PHILIP L. GORDON ET AL., SOCIAL MEDIA PASSWORD PROTECTION AND PRIVACY—THE PATCHWORK
OF STATE LAWS AND HOW IT AFFECTS EMPLOYERS, 3–4, 11 (2013), http://www.littler.com/files/press/
pdf/WPI-Social-Media-Password-Protection-Privacy-May-2013.pdf.
138Gaydos, supra note 9.
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or that existing law already prohibits this activity.139 As discussed in this
part, some of these arguments simply fail; others, although credible, are
ultimately not persuasive.
Although the statistics vary, obviously many employers rely upon on
social networking sites, at least in part, to screen applicants.140 However,
users are increasingly relying upon privacy settings to limit the public’s
access to their social media profiles,141 which means employers who seek
publicly available social media information about those users may come up
empty-handed. Asking for direct access in a job interview or from a current
employee is a logical next step for employers seeking this type of infor-
mation.142 Indeed, deplorable though it may be, some employers have
done just that, as made clear in the Introduction.143 Although calling this
practice a trend may be a stretch,144 the likelihood that employers are
currently or will begin to ask employees or job applicants for online
account login information is significant enough that seventeen states have
already passed legislation to curtail the practice and twenty-seven more
have or are considering it. Moreover, a legislative body does not need a
large number of examples of egregious behavior before it acts to prohibit
it. Legislatures can—and do—anticipate problems and seek to prevent
139See, e.g., Anita Ramasastry, Can Employers Legally Ask for Your Facebook Password When You
Apply for a Job?: Why Congress and the States Should Prohibit This Practice, VERDICT: LEGAL ANALYSIS
AND COMMENT. FROM JUSTIA (Mar. 27, 2012), http://verdict.justia.com/2012/03/27/can-
employers-legally-ask-you-for-your-facebook-password-when-you-apply-for-a-job.
140See Managing Your Online Image Across Social Networks, supra note 5.
141See GORDON ET AL., supra note 137, at 2 (“[U]sers of social media increasingly are resorting
to the privacy settings to screen their social media activity from others, including employers.
According to one study, 15 percent of Facebook users (or nearly 150 million users), 7 percent
of LinkedIn users (or nearly 15 million users), and 5 percent of Twitter users (or more than
27 million) modified privacy settings specifically with work in mind. These statistics do not
encompass the tens of millions of other users who take advantage of privacy settings for other
reasons.”) (footnote omitted); MADDEN, supra note 6, at 7–8; What Is the “Norm” for Privacy
Settings on Social Networking Sites?, supra note 6.
142See Bradley Shear, SNOPA: A Privacy Win-Win for Social Media Age, INNOVATION INSIGHTS
(Feb. 19, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://insights.wired.com/profiles/blogs/right-to-digital-privacy-
will-be-protected-by-the-social#axzz2WWHKcFsV (“Without the protections that [password
protection legislation] provides, how long will it be before it becomes commonplace for
employers to require job applicants and/or employees provide access to personal password
protected digital accounts as part of the employment process?”).
143See supra text accompanying notes 1–4.
144See supra text accompanying notes 8–9.
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them before they escalate. Attorney Bradley Shear, a proponent of this
legislation, has pointed to the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act
of 2008 (GINA)145 as one such example:
GINA was not enacted because of a high profile incident where an employer
required a candidate to submit his genetic information as part of the applica-
tion process; it was enacted as a pre-emptive measure. In contrast, there are
already multiple verifiable situations where employers are requiring job appli-
cants provide their personal digital credentials as part of the application
process.146
Given that employee privacy interests have become virtually nonexis-
tent,147 any attempt at increasing them should be encouraged.
At least one critic of this legislation has suggested that social media
websites’ Terms of Service (TOS) agreements will prevent employers from
doing this because it violates TOS provisions.148 For instance, the Facebook
Statement of Rights and Responsibilities states that users “will not share
your password . . . , let anyone else access your account, or do anything
else that might jeopardize the security of your account.”149 LinkedIn con-
tains a similar provision.150 However, the TOS agreements are not legally
binding on others, such as employers, who may not even be users of the
site. As such, it is highly unlikely that social media websites’ TOS will deter
employers from this practice.
Some of the criticism leveled at the passage of this legislation ignores
important characteristics of social media. For instance, consider the dra-
matic hand-wringing contained in the following report, written by attor-
ney Philip Gordon, a frequent critic of this legislative trend:
The underlying premise of these laws is that an employer invades an appli-
cant’s or employee’s privacy by viewing content on a restricted access social
media account without the voluntary consent of the account holder. Digging
one step deeper, these laws, at their core, assume that the content of a
145Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008).
146Shear, supra note 142.
147See supra note 89.
148See Gaydos, supra note 9.
149Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (last
updated Nov. 15, 2013).
150User Agreement § 2.4, LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com/legal/user-agreement (last updated
Mar. 26, 2014).
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restricted access social media account is private no matter how many people
the user invites to view that content and regardless of the relationship between
the user and the viewer. Put more plainly, these laws are based on the belief
that, for example, a Facebook user who has more than 500 “Friends,” includ-
ing current and former supervisors and other executives at his current
employer, can establish the “privacy” of his content by using Facebook’s
privacy settings to restrict access to “Friends Only.”
No court has ever construed the tort of invasion of privacy by intrusion upon
seclusion so broadly. That tort requires a “private fact” which can be the
subject of an intrusion. The vast majority of courts have held that, if the fact
that is the subject of the claim has been disclosed to even a few people not
under a legal or contractual obligation of confidentiality, the fact is not private
and the intrusion upon seclusion claim fails. To be sure, a few cases have
permitted an intrusion upon seclusion claim to proceed even though the
plaintiff had shared the private fact with others. However, in virtually all of
these cases, the private fact was shared within a group that had a specific
relationship with the plaintiff, such as coworkers or co-participants in an in
vitro fertilization program. We are not aware of any case holding that facts
disclosed to dozens or hundreds of people who do not form a cohesive group
are “private facts,” especially when that group includes management-level
employees of the employer who is the defendant on the privacy claim. In sum,
the password protection laws create a “ring of privacy” with a circumference
far larger than any court has recognized to date.151
As discussed previously, robust social media sites, such as Facebook or
LinkedIn, often serve a variety of different functions, some of which allow
users to post “private facts” that the law may protect—either through a
private message sent to another user or by limiting which contacts may
view posted content.152 A person with access to the account may not
necessarily know which areas are private and which are public until the
private content has been seen. By then, the damage has been done. Thus,
at least with regard to private messages exchanged via social media sites or
posts with limited visibility, the password protection laws hardly create a
new “ring of privacy” as Gordon claims. Instead, they simply recognize
that new technology requires enhanced privacy legislation to ensure that
existing privacy rights are appropriately recognized and protected.
Moreover, assuming this legislation does indeed create new privacy
rights in personal online accounts, this is a suitable response to the demise
151GORDON ET AL., supra note 137, at 3–4 (footnotes omitted). This quote is taken from a
subsection titled “How Social Media ‘Password Protection’ Legislation Radically Rewrites the
Common Law of Privacy.” Id.
152See supra note 94 and accompanying text; see also Ehling II, 961 F. Supp. 2d 659, 669 (D.N.J.
2013).
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of employee privacy rights in recent years, especially regarding employees
and applicants who attempt to preserve the privacy of their personal
accounts. Gordon’s argument ignores case law that indicates that some
courts are ready to find privacy rights in the very type of social media
content he addresses. Ehling II and Crispin in particular are such cases.
Also, Determann and Sprague point out that Stengart, Pure Power Boot
Camp, and Pietrylo “indicate a clear willingness on the part of the courts to
consider e-mail and other types of electronic messages stored on personal
web-based accounts to be within a zone in which employees have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy.”153 Thus far, however, these cases are few
and far between. Given the snail’s pace at which courts are addressing
these issues, legislative response is entirely appropriate.
The final argument against the necessity for password protection
legislation is that existing law, such as the National Labor Relations Act154
(NLRA), common law privacy torts, and the SCA, may already prohibit
employers from asking for personal online account access. Although the
possible applicability of the SCA is an interesting suggestion, it, as well as the
other existing laws upon which opponents rely, does not provide convincing
support for the claim that password protection laws are unnecessary.
The NLRA and common law privacy claims might give employees
some relief from privacy intrusions of the kind contemplated in this article.
However, because the NLRA applies only to concerted activity,155 it will not
support employees or job applicants acting alone (which of course most
do) who object to requests for online account password information.
Regarding common law privacy claims, the most likely of which is intru-
sion into seclusion,156 most courts have held that consent is a bar to this
claim.157 As explained in more detail later regarding the possible applica-
bility of the SCA, although many scholars argue that valid employee
153Determann & Sprague, supra note 89, at 1009.
154Pub. L. No. 74-198, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169
(2012)).
15529 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (“Employees shall have the right to . . . engage in . . . concerted
activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection. . . .”).
156Note, Negligent Hiring and the Information Age: How State Legislatures Can Save Employers from
Inevitable Liability, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1397, 1416 (2012) (“Of the four common law
invasion of privacy torts, most plaintiffs turn to intrusion upon seclusion to redress privacy
violations in the employment context.”).
157See 62A AM. JUR. 2d Privacy § 221 (Feb. 2014 update).
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consent is suspect in the employment relationship, courts are still willing to
find that consent bars a claim in SCA cases.158 Just as the lack of consent will
not be present in all SCA claims, the same is true here. Even more
persuasively, employee plaintiffs have generally had little success in bring-
ing tort claims for intrusion upon seclusion against employers. Indeed,
many scholars have criticized the common law tort of invasion of privacy as
being a woefully inadequate source of privacy protection, especially
because courts often look to employer practices, rather than existing social
norms, to determine whether particular behavior is reasonable.159
Finally, Gordon and other opponents of the legislation argue that the
SCA, which makes it illegal to intentionally access electronic communica-
tions without authorization, already prevents employers from asking for
login information to employees’ or applicants’ online accounts.160 Of all the
criticisms against this legislation, the argument that the SCA may already
prohibit employers from accessing employees’ or applicants’ online
accounts is the strongest, although it too is not persuasive enough to
conclude that the legislation is unnecessary.
158See infra text accompanying notes 163–164; cf. Poore, supra note 8, at 514 (“The tort of
intrusion upon seclusion involves a simple breach of privacy with no further dissemination
required, but a social media site user’s consent to be monitored or his or her voluntarily
surrender [sic] of an account password would likely defeat any action under this tort, because
the intrusion must be unauthorized to be actionable.”).
159See Kim, supra note 89, at 908 (“Such an approach permits employers to destroy any
expectations of privacy simply by announcing privacy-invading practices in advance, and
regularly carrying them out. The common law privacy tort similarly turns on business
practices, and courts have relied on the existence of a business justification to reduce an
employee’s expectation of privacy or render the intrusion inoffensive”) (footnote omitted); see
also, e.g., Ciocchetti, supra note 17, at 300 (citing Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., 990
A.2d 650, 665 (N.J. 2009)); Ronald P. Angerer II, Moving Beyond a Brick and Mortar Under-
standing of State Action: The Case for a More Majestic State Action Doctrine to Protect Employee Privacy
in the Workplace, 4 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2013).
16018 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012); see Philip Gordon, New Jersey Court’s Decision Provides Roadmap for
Access to Employees’ Restricted Social Media Content, PUBLICATIONS: LITTLER MENDELSON
(Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/new-jersey-court-access-
employees-restricted-social-media; Rebekah Bradway, Social Media Password Privacy Legis-
lation: The Trend, Utah’s Law, and Whether It’s Necessary 11 (Apr. 26, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/138106188/Social-Media-Password-
Privacy-Legislation (arguing that existing law, such as the SCA, make password protection
laws “excessive”); Daniel I. Prywes & Jena M. Valdetero, Proceed at Your Peril: Questions Abound
with New State Laws Restricting Employer Access to Employees’ Personal Social Media Accounts,
BLOOMBERG BNA ( June 10, 2013), http://www.bna.com/new-state-laws-restricting-employer-
access-to-employees-personal-social-media-accounts/; Ramasastry, supra note 139.
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It is true that “courts have held that plaintiffs may maintain claims for
violation of the SCA where employers accessed websites without authori-
zation even though the websites were accessible to other parties.”161 In fact,
the important decision in Ehling II held that the SCA applies to nonpublic
Facebook posts:
. . . Facebook wall posts that are configured to be private are, by definition, not
accessible to the general public. The touchstone of the Electronic Communi-
cations Privacy Act is that it protects private information. The language of the
statute makes clear that the statute’s purpose is to protect information that the
communicator took steps to keep private. Cases interpreting the SCA confirm
that information is protectable as long as the communicator actively restricts
the public from accessing the information.
. . . The Court finds that, when users make their Facebook wall posts inacces-
sible to the general public, the wall posts are “configured to be private” for
purposes of the SCA.162
After determining that the SCA is applicable to a particular private
electronic message, the next step is to consider whether any exceptions
apply, one of which is a requirement that the access to the communication
be “unauthorized.”163 Indeed, the SCA cases that are applicable to the topic
of this article all turn on the issue of whether the access was authorized. In
Ehling II, after holding that the SCA applied to private social media wall
posts, the court found that the employer had not violated the SCA because
the person who accessed the account in question and provided informa-
tion to the employer was one of the plaintiff’s accepted contacts and was
thus authorized to view and even make copies of the posts.164 However,
other cases have reached an opposite conclusion and found access to be
unauthorized. In Pure Power Boot Camp, the court found that the employer
violated the SCA by accessing the employee’s personal e-mail account
through the employee’s saved username and password on the employer’s
computer.165 The court in Pietrylo v. Hillstone Restaurant Group upheld the
jury’s determination that the employer violated the SCA by demanding a
password from an employee to a private blog because the employee was
161Argento, supra note 90, at 236–37.
162Ehling II, 961 F. Supp. 2d 659, 668 (D.N.J. 2013) (citations omitted).
16318 U.S.C. § 2701; Ehling II, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 669.
164Ehling II, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 669–70.
165Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d 548, 556 (S.D.N.Y.
2008).
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essentially coerced into providing that information.166 Finally, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held in Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. that the
President of Hawaiian Airlines violated the SCA by using other users’
passwords (even though given voluntarily) to access a private blog created
by a Hawaiian Airlines pilot.167
While the previously mentioned cases are helpful and encouraging,
the concept of valid employee consent is complex. Many scholars argue
that an employee’s consent to particular employer demands is often
suspect. One commentator argues persuasively that requiring job appli-
cants or employees to provide their user name or login information so that
employers can access personal media accounts is inherently coercive, given
the nature of the relationship between the two parties.168 Willborn makes
a similar argument, noting that the issue of consent in the privacy context
“creates special problems in the workplace. Everyone agrees that consent
is a difficult and compromised concept in employment law, although the
reasons vary. . . . But the bottom line is the same: consent within the
employment relationship is compromised and must be regarded with at
least some skepticism.”169
Certainly the possible applicability of the SCA should cause employ-
ers to consider carefully whether to seek access to an employee’s online
accounts (at least in those states in which the practice has not been pro-
hibited). An employee who is faced with either termination or allowing an
166Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06–5754 (FSH), 2009 WL 3128420, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept.
25, 2009).
167302 F.3d 868, 879–80 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding the users who granted access had not
actually used the site and therefore could not qualify as authorized users under the statute).
168Nicholas D. Beadle, Note, A Risk Not Worth the Reward: The Stored Communications Act and
Employers’ Collection of Employees’ and Job Applicant’s Social Networking Passwords, 1 AM. U. BUS.
L. REV. 397, 403 (2012) (“[E]mployees who disclose their passwords in this scenario do not so
much choose to reveal them as they are compelled. Employers should know such disclosure
is not voluntary; therefore, successful demands for employee passwords do not produce SCA
authorization.”) (footnote omitted). Beadle makes a similar argument regarding applicants.
Id. at 403–04.
169Steven L. Willborn, Consenting Employees: Workplace Privacy and the Role of Consent, 66 LA. L.
REV. 975, 976 (2006) (footnotes omitted); see also Chang, supra note 87, at 1 (“[W]ith unem-
ployment close to 13 million people, many who obtain an interview may not be in a position
to say no and walk away.”); Roche, supra note 87, at 191; Valdes & McFarland, supra note 1
(“Lori Andrews, a law professor at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law specializing in Internet
privacy, is concerned about the pressure placed on applicants, even if they voluntarily provide
access to social sites. ‘Volunteering is coercion if you need a job,’ Andrews said.”).
812 Vol. 51 / American Business Law Journal
employer to access her private information (or a job applicant looking for
work) may very well have an argument that such a Hobson’s choice is the
type of coercion that the SCA prohibits. However, not all cases will involve
coercion of the type that implicates violation of the SCA, regardless of how
one feels about the issue of meaningful consent. As the Introduction to this
article explains, at least one job applicant, Justin Bassett, refused to
consent and walked away from the job.170 Furthermore, although Pietrylo
supports a conclusion that employees may be coerced into allowing
access,171 other cases support an opposite conclusion. “Because employees
may be deemed to have consented to surveillance . . . the Act’s protections
have been found inapplicable in a number of workplace cases.”172 Thus,
although it may be valid in some cases, a claim that access to an online
account was unauthorized because the employee or applicant did not truly
consent is not a reliable or consistent source of privacy protection.
The SCA is also an inadequate privacy safeguard because, as courts,
scholars, and commentators agree, it is outdated, complicated, and con-
fusing.173 Its limitations regarding the technology to which it applies has
170See supra text accompanying note 1.
171See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
172Kim, supra note 89, at 914–15. Kim concludes that “[a]lthough the ECPA could be inter-
preted in ways more protective of employee privacy, under current interpretations it pro-
vides rather weak protection against employer scrutiny of employees’ electronic
communications.” Id. at 915 (footnote omitted); see also Determann & Sprague, supra note 89,
at 1001 (“Because of the exemptions contained in both the Wiretap Act and the SCA,
commentators are in general agreement that the ECPA is ineffective in providing employees
with any privacy protections relative to work-related e-mail messages and other forms of wire
and electronic communications.”); Poore, supra note 8, at 517 (“Although the Pietrylo court
found that coerced consent is not authorization within the meaning of the SCA, other courts
could rule the other way.”).
173See, e.g. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting the
ECPA “is ill-suited to address modern forms of communication”); Steve Jackson Games, Inc.
v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating the ECPA “is famous (if not
infamous) for its lack of clarity”); Determann & Sprague, supra note 89, at 998–99 (“[A]pply-
ing the ECPA has been wrought with difficulty, particularly for alleged violations arising from
the workplace. . . . It has not been regarded as a model of statutory clarity.”); Simon M.
Baker, Seminar Article, Unfriending the Stored Communications Act: How Technological Advance-
ment and Legislative Inaction Have Rendered Its Protections Obsolete, 22 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. L. 75, 109 (2011) (“[The SCA] is simply not designed to deal with modern
technology.”); Rudolph J. Burshnic, Note, Applying the Stored Communications Act to the Civil
Discovery of Social Networking Sites, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1259, 1264 (2012) (“The SCA is
notoriously complicated and confusing, and its application to social networking sites has only
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resulted in courts’ increasing inability to apply it uniformly. Protection may
also depend on where the communications are stored and whether they
have been read by the recipient.174 Medina notes, for example, that “the
same email is subject to different protection depending on whether it is in
transit, stored on a home computer, opened and stored in remote storage,
unopened and stored in remote storage for 180 days or less, or unopened
and stored in remote storage for more than 180 days.”175 Given that
private messages sent between users on a social media website are similar
to e-mail, not surprisingly, Crispin held that the SCA applies to them,
depending upon whether they are read or unread.176 Further, although
Ehling II and Crispin both held that the SCA applies to content posted on
a Facebook user’s wall, in light of the current variation in SCA case law,
these cases are certainly no guarantee that other courts will reach similar
conclusions.177
Practical limitations also weaken the argument that the SCA prohibits
employers from asking for online account passwords. Much of the social
media access legislation extends beyond attempts to gain direct access by
also prohibiting indirect access such as shoulder surfing or requiring the
applicant or employee to change existing privacy settings so that the
further muddied the waters.”) (footnote omitted); Lindsay S. Feuer, Note, Who Is Poking
Around Your Facebook Profile?: The Need to Reform the Stored Communications Act to Reflect a Lack
of Privacy on Social Networking Websites, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 473, 502 (2011) (noting that, with
respect to the SCA, “[s]everal courts have experienced difficulty in analyzing problems
involving modern technology within the confines of the current statutory framework”);
Melissa Medina, Note, The Stored Communications Act: An Old Statute for Modern Times, 63 AM.
U. L. REV. 267, 270 (2013) (“[D]iverging judicial interpretations regarding the SCA’s appli-
cability to modern technologies, such as Webmail, have created serious concerns as to the
statute’s continued viability. . . . These differing interpretations have created uncertainty
regarding the scope of the SCA.”) (footnote omitted).
174See Soma et al., supra note 86, at 520–21 (discussing different privacy protection under the
SCA depending on whether a message is in transmission or storage); Arredondo-Santisteban,
supra note 20, at 224–24.
175Medina, supra note 173, at 292.
176See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 991 (C.D. Cal 2010); supra text
accompanying note 104.
177State laws similar to the SCA are also unlikely to provide privacy protection to employees.
See Kim, supra note 89, at 915 n.68 (“A number of states have enacted statutory protections
analogous to the federal ECPA and in some cases, these statutes have narrower exceptions.
Nevertheless, these state laws have generally not provided any significant protection in the
employment context.”).
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information is publicly available.178 Whether the SCA would prohibit either
of those two actions is questionable. The SCA is also a cumbersome,
inefficient method of protecting privacy rights and may not have a signifi-
cant impact on employer behavior. Only the few employees who are
negatively affected by such an intrusion will bring a case, and even those
will take time to be resolved. “However, all employees . . . subjected to
these intrusions have experienced an invasion of their right to information
privacy.”179
Clearly then, forcing employees to rely on existing law (to the extent
that it is even applicable at all) to protect and enforce their privacy rights
is not a fair or workable solution. Laws that may apply to one employee will
simply not be applicable to others, leaving many victims without adequate
recourse. Indeed, those existing laws certainly did not protect Robert
Collins or Justin Bassett.180 In the absence of coercion or evidence that
private messages were read or unread, as is required to prove violation of
the SCA, or the concerted activity required for the NLRA to apply, larger
concerns related to employee privacy and dignity dictate that putting an
employee in such a position should simply be off limits (within limited
exceptions). An affirmative legislative statement of public policy regarding
employee privacy rights is a far better alternative. Failure to do so sends an
equally clear message that employee privacy rights are not important. “By
finding that certain areas are worthy of protection, the law validates and
reinforces claims of privacy; by declining to do so, the law negates those
claims, further diminishing expectations of privacy.”181
Lastly, this legislation is currently applicable to employers in seven-
teen states. Congress and twenty-seven other states have or are consider-
ing it. Should the trend continue, at least some of those states will enact
some form of the legislation in the coming years. In those states, the
question of whether existing law applies is less relevant. Of more relevancy
are efforts to improve upon those statutes and legislative proposals so that
they are meaningful and well balanced. To the extent that the legislation is
here to stay, the Proposed Act in this article is useful.
178See supra text accompanying notes 55–57.
179Poore, supra note 8, at 518.
180See supra text accompanying notes 1–2.
181Kim, supra note 89, at 917.
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At this point, it also bears mentioning that password legislation may
benefit employers, at least according to some scholars and practitioners.
Much has been written about the need for employers to take care when
searching online for information about job applicants to avoid discovering
details about the applicant’s protected status.182 This may be especially true
if employers access private material posted on the applicant’s social media
profile. Statutes that limit access to personal online accounts ensure that
employers do not unwittingly learn about protected information that the
employee attempted to keep confidential. It may also protect employers
from negligent hiring claims. Bradley Shear points out that Maryland’s
legislation may save Maryland businesses millions of dollars a year in costs
to monitor their employees’ personal digital accounts as well as in cyber
liability insurance premiums that would accompany a duty to monitor
employees in the digital and social media space.183 He also concluded that
because businesses will not have access to employees’ digital content, they
also will not be liable for it.184
Although this article advocates in favor of the need for online account
password protection legislation, it shares some concerns regarding the
statutory patchwork that multistate employers must negotiate, as well as
182See, e.g., Chang, supra note 87, at 4 (“[U]sing social media to screen applicants carries
considerable legal risks. For example, an employer could—even unknowingly—make a
hiring decision based on an applicant’s Title VII or ADA protected status. If a hiring manager
searches an applicant’s Facebook photos and sees her wedding pictures, the applicant’s
religion may be revealed. His alumni affiliation may reveal his age. . . . Our social networking
activity holds a library of information.”); Poore, supra note 8, at 519 (“Employers . . . who pry
into the online activities of potential and current employees . . . might face unanticipated
liability based upon adverse action they take in response to content they view on social media
accounts. . . . Information that an employer . . . accesses on a social media site may reveal that
an individual is a member of a protected group, based upon age, disability, marital status,
religion, race, or national origin, for example.”); Schess, supra note 91, at 447.
183Bradley Shear, Maryland’s Facebook Username and Password Law Is a Win for Employers,
Employees, and Job Applicants, SHEAR ON SOCIAL MEDIA LAW (May 2, 2012) [hereinafter Maryland’s
Facebook Username and Password Law Is a Win for Employers], http://www.shearsocialmedia.com/
2012/05/marylands-facebook-username-and.html. Shear has argued further that
Protecting personal digital privacy will help grow the economy and foment new tech-
nological breakthroughs. If people believe their personal password protected digital
thoughts, ideas, and creations are statutorily protected they will increase their usage of
Dropbox, Microsoft SkyDrive, Google Plus, Facebook, etc. It is vital for our country’s
competitive future to implement public policy that encourages increased digital plat-
form participation in our increasingly connected world.
Shear, supra note 142 (alteration omitted).
184Shear, Maryland’s Facebook Username and Password Law Is a Win for Employers, supra note 183.
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issues regarding particular provisions of individual pieces of legislation.
The outcome of the present situation, in which the law differs considerably
from state to state, is likely to cause confusion and administrative ineffi-
ciencies for employers, both within their own states and for those who
manage employees elsewhere.185 The varying definitions of important
terms such as “social media” and “personal account” (or the lack of such
definitions altogether), and the differences in scope regarding prohibited
activity, the exceptions, and the available remedies, are also areas of
concern. Additionally, many of the existing statutes and proposed bills are
overbroad by giving the employer unlimited access to largely personal
accounts that are used for only limited employment purposes. These issues
lead to a conclusion that the uniformity available by adopting a model
statute is desirable. The Proposed Act presented in this article, to which we
now turn, addresses these issues. Further discussion about some of the
major problems with existing legislation, as well as an explanation for how
the Proposed Act addresses them, follow in Part III.B.
III. THE PROPOSED ACT—STRIKING THE
PROPER BALANCE
While the state statutes are a good beginning toward recognizing legiti-
mate privacy interests in employees’ and applicants’ online accounts, the
many differences among the conflicting laws are a major problem. More-
over, many leave out important features while others are overbroad and
weighted too heavily in favor of employers. Given that technology moni-
toring is an issue of national importance,186 federal legislation is the best
solution.187 A federal statute is the most efficient and appropriate way to
guarantee online employee privacy and ensure uniformity, resulting in a
185GORDON ET AL., supra note 137, at 11 (“As additional laws are considered and no doubt
passed by other states, the potential for confusion and administrative difficulty will only
increase.”).
186Levinson, supra note 16, at 419–21.
187Even those generally opposed to the legislation agree that one federal law is preferable to
the current system. See, e.g., GORDON ET AL., supra note 137, at 13 (“[T]here does not appear
to be any end in sight to the rash of legislation. As such, the only practical solution may be
legislation at the federal level that will preempt all state legislation and common law tort
claims . . . covering the subject matter to prevent the patchwork of state laws from becoming
even more complex and even more unwieldy.”).
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proper balance of the interests involved, among states across the nation,
and also between individual employers and employees.188 Federal legisla-
tion will also benefit employers, especially those operating in several states,
by easing the administrative burdens of developing and maintaining con-
sistent policies, which will result in more employees being treated with
dignity and fairness.189 Particularly with regard to the flawed application of
the SCA, a federal statute is desirable.190 Even in the absence of federal
legislation, those states currently considering enacting this type of legisla-
tion may benefit from the following Proposed Act and the discussion that
follows.191 It may also help state legislatures improve the statutes they have
already enacted.192
A. The Employee Internet Privacy Protection Act
The proposal below, titled the “Employee Internet Privacy Protection Act,”
borrows from the best of the current statutes, proposed laws, and other
suggestions regarding model privacy legislation. Sources and minor
188Id.; see also, Lipps, supra note 96, at 674 (“A federal statute would provide a clear indication
from Congress of the importance of protecting electronic communication, and would not
subject employers to a variety of state statutes and judicial interpretations.”); Soma et al.,
supra note 86, at 527 (“Because the reach of e-messaging services erases state and national
borders, any legislative action to further address and clarify e-message privacy interests must
be undertaken at a federal level to be effective.”) (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Poore, supra note 8, at 509 (“Federal legislation could provide a comprehensive set
of protections with appropriate exceptions and resolve apparent conflicts between state laws
and other federal laws in this subject area.”).
189Levinson, supra note 16, at 421.
190See, e.g., Ariana R. Levinson, Toward a Cohesive Interpretation of the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act for the Electronic Monitoring of Employees, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 461, 529 (2012)
(arguing that a federal statute, replacing the ECPA, designed to regulate employee monitor-
ing would be ideal because it would establish baseline protections for employees’ right to
privacy).
191Levinson, supra note 16, at 393 (“[A]n actual draft may be helpful in pushing legislatures
to adopt real change. Providing a legislature with a draft rather than only ideas may result in
a more receptive audience because a draft appears to provide a more definite course for
reform and to be less onerous than starting from scratch. The legislature may have to assess
every provision and may decide to change every one, but by providing a starting point, the
process of beginning may be made easier.”).
192Interview with Brian Cronin, former Idaho State Representative, in Boise, ID (Aug. 20,
2013) (stating that legislatures spend a lot of time in subsequent years revising statutes to clear
up unintended problems).
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explanations are annotated in footnotes within the Proposed Act itself. Part
III.B addresses the important considerations underlying the chosen
language.
I. Definitions
A. Employer—a public or nonpublic entity, an individual engaged in
a business, or any other person or organization that obtains the
services of individuals in exchange for financial remuneration.
Employer shall also include any agent, representative, or designee
of such an employer.193
B. Employee—any person who works, including part time, for an
employer in exchange for financial remuneration. Employee
includes an independent contractor.194
C. Personal online account or service—any collection of electronically
stored information, including, but not limited to, such collections
stored on social media Internet web sites, in electronic mail, and
on electronic devices, which are opened, used, or maintained by
any employee or applicant primarily for personal communications
unrelated to the employer’s business purposes.195
193This provision draws from L.B. 58, 103d Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2013) (“Employer means a
public or nonpublic entity or an individual engaged in a business, an industry, a profession,
a trade, or other enterprise in the state, including any agent, representative, or designee of
such an employer.”) and the Model Electronic Privacy Act, § 1(c), Legislative Briefing Kit on
Electronic Monitoring, ACLU (Mar. 11, 2001), https://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/
legislative-briefing-kit-electronic-monitoring (defining an employer as “any person,
partnership, corporation, or other organization engaged in commerce, or any other
person or organization which obtains the services of individuals in exchange for financial
remuneration”).
194Model Electronic Privacy Act, supra note 193, § 1(b) (“[T]he term ‘employee’ means any
person who performs services for an employer in exchange for financial remuneration,
including part time, leased, or former employees.”); Levinson, supra note 16, at 395
(“Employee means any person who works, including part-time, for an employer ‘in exchange
for financial remuneration.’ ”) (quoting Model Electronic Privacy Act supra note 193, § 1(b));
L.B. 1194, 2013 Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2013) (“ ‘Employee’ means a person who is
permitted, required or directed by an employer to engage in employment for consideration
of direct or indirect gain or profit. ‘Employee’ includes an independent contractor.”).
195See UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-48-102(4)(a) (West 2013) (“Personal internet account means an
online account that is used by an employee or applicant exclusively for personal communi-
cations unrelated to any business purpose of the employer.”); H.B. 1407, 2014 Leg., Reg.
Sess., (N.H. 2014) (“Personal account means an account, service, or profile on a social
networking website that is used by a current or prospective employee primarily for personal
communications unrelated to any business purposes of the employer.”).
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II. Prohibited Acts. An employer shall not:
A. Suggest, request, require, or cause an employee or applicant for
employment to do any of the following:
1. Grant access to, allow observation of, or disclose information
that allows access to or observation of the employee’s or appli-
cant’s personal online account or service;196
2. Add any person, including the employer or his or her agent, to
the employee’s or applicant’s list of contacts associated with a
personal online account;197
3. Divulge any information or content from an employee’s or
applicant’s personal online account;198 or
4. Change or alter the privacy settings associated with the employ-
ee’s or applicant’s personal online account to affect a third
party’s ability to view the contents of the account.199
B. Discharge, discipline, fail to hire, or otherwise penalize an
employee or applicant for asserting his or her rights under this
statute, assisting other employees in asserting their rights, report-
ing violations of this statute, or participating in enforcement
actions under this statute.200
III. Exceptions. Nothing in this Act shall prohibit an employer from:
A. Requesting or requiring an employee to allow observation
of content from his or her personal online account
196This language comes directly from MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.273(a) (West 2012). It
prohibits both direct and indirect access in one clear section.
197See ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-2-124(b)(1)(B) (West 2013) (“An employer shall not
require, request, suggest, or cause a current or prospective employee to. . . [a]dd an
employee, supervisor, or administrator to the list or contacts associated with his
or her social media account. . . .”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-127(2)(a) West (2013); OR.
REV. STAT. § 659A.330(1)(b) (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.44.200(1)(c) (West
2013).
198See CAL. LAB. CODE § 980(b)(3) (West 2013).
199See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.44.200(1)(d) (“An employer may not . . . [r]equest,
require, or cause an employee or applicant to alter the settings on his or her personal
social networking account that affect a third party’s ability to view the contents of the
account. . . .”); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-2-124(b)(1)(C); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-
127(2)(a).
200This borrows from both MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.273(b) and the Model Privacy Act,
supra note 193, § 7.
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as cooperation in the employer’s work-related investiga-
tion if:201
1. The employer is conducting a formal investigation, based upon
receipt of reliable and reasonable information regarding
employee misconduct, and requires observation of this content
to ensure compliance with the employer’s written employment
policies;202 and
2. The observation of such content is reasonably necessary to
make a factual determination in the course of conducting a
reasonable investigation; and
3. The employer does not request, require, suggest, or cause the
employee to grant access to or disclose information that allows
access to the employee’s or applicant’s personal online account
or service.203
4. An employer exercising its rights under the immediately pre-
ceding subdivisions of this section shall use any information
obtained through observation of the employee’s personal
online account only for the purpose of the formal investigation
or a related proceeding.204
201This provision allows only for observation of particular content, borrowing from the
concepts found in the Oregon and Washington statutes that do not allow direct access via
login information. See OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.330(4); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.44.200(2).
202This section builds on the concept found in the Colorado and Utah statutes that allows for
certain exceptions based upon receipt of information regarding misconduct or violation of
the law. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-2-127(4)(a) and (b); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-48-
202(1)(c)(i) and (ii) (West 2013) (providing that an employer is not prohibited from conduct-
ing an investigation if there is “specific information” indicating it is necessary to ensure
compliance with the law or that there has been an unauthorized transfer of proprietary,
confidential, or financial information to the employee’s personal Internet account).
203OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.330(4) (“Nothing in this section prevents an employer from . . .
[c]onducting an investigation, without requiring an employee to provide a user name and
password, password or other means of authentication that provides access to a personal social
media account of the employee. . . .”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.44.200(2)(d) (“This section
does not apply to an employer’s request or requirement that an employee share content from
his or her personal social networking account if the . . . employer does not request or require
the employee to provide his or her login information.”).
204This borrows language from CAL. LAB. CODE § 980(c) (West 2013) (providing “that the social
media is used solely for purposes of that investigation or a related proceedings”) and ARK.
CODE ANN. § 11-2-124(e)(2)(B) (“If the employer exercises its rights under . . . this section, the
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B. Requiring or requesting an employee to disclose a username,
password, or other method of accessing an online account or
service that is:
1. Provided by the employer; or
2. Set up by the employee at the employer’s request; or
3. Obtained by virtue of the employee’s employment relationship
with the employer;205 or
4. Used primarily for the employer’s business purposes.
C. Requiring or requesting an employee to disclose a username,
password, or other method of accessing an employer-issued or
employer-owned, in whole or in part, electronic device.206
D. Obtaining information about an applicant or employee that is
available in the public domain.207
IV. Waiver of Rights
A. The rights provided by this Act may not be waived, by contract or
otherwise.208
V. Enforcement and Remedies
A. An employee or applicant who is injured by a violation of this Act
may file a claim with the Department of Labor or bring a civil
action against the employer in a court of competent jurisdiction.209
employee’s username and password shall only be used for the purpose of the formal inves-
tigation or a related proceeding.”).
205See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-127(2)(b) (“[T]his subsection (2) does not prohibit an
employer from requiring an employee to disclose any user name, password, or other means
for accessing nonpersonal accounts or services that provide access to the employer’s internal
computer or information systems.”); see also 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/10(b)(2)(B) (West
2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4-34(B)(2) (West 2013).
206See CAL. LAB. CODE § 980(d).
207See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/10(b)(3); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.330(5).
208See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:6B-7 (West 2013) (“No employer shall require an individual to
waive or limit any protection granted under this act as a condition of applying for or receiving
an offer of employment. An agreement to waive any right or protection under this Act is
against the public policy of this State and is void and unenforceable.”); Model Privacy Act
supra note 193, § 9; Levinson, supra note 16, at 418.
209See Levinson, supra note 16, at 416.
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B. An employer who violates any provision of this act may be assessed
a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed $1,000 for the first
violation and up to $5,000 for each subsequent violation.210
C. In an action brought under this statute, if the court finds a viola-
tion of this chapter, in addition to assessing a civil penalty as set
forth in Section V.B., the court may also award the prevailing
employee or applicant reasonable attorney fees and costs, actual
damages, and injunctive or other equitable relief, including miti-
gation or removal of any discipline imposed, reinstatement, pro-
motion, back pay, and lost benefits.211
B. Proposed Act Discussion
Section (I)—Definitions. The Proposed Act broadly defines the terms
employer and employee to cover both private and public employers, the
employer’s agents or representatives, and full- or part-time employees. It
also extends to independent contractors. “[T]he rationale of the broad
definition is that no employer is too small to take adequate protections to
safeguard its employees’ privacy.”212 Similarly, any person who works for
another, whether as an employee or an independent contractor, has
privacy interests that should be recognized.213
One major concern raised by the different statutes relates to the
accounts or devices that the statutes cover. Many are simply too vague
because they apply to “social media” and yet fail to define the term.214
Others, such as California, define “social media” too broadly,215 and the
210See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-127(5); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:6B-9 (providing up to $2,500
for subsequent violations).
211See Levinson, supra note 16, at 416.
212Id. at 423.
213The proposal does not define obvious terms such as “job applicant.”
214For instance, both the Colorado and Maryland statutes apply to social media accounts, yet
neither define the term.
215CAL. LAB. CODE § 980(a) (West 2013) (“As used in this chapter, “social media” means an
electronic service or account, or electronic content, including, but not limited to, videos, still
photographs, blogs, video blogs, podcasts, instant and text messages, email, online services or
accounts, or Internet Web site profiles or locations.”); see also Eric Goldman, Big Problems in
California’s New Law Restricting Employers’ Access to Employees’ Online Accounts, FORBES (Sept.
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Illinois statute inexplicably excludes e-mail from the reach of the law.216 A
few states differentiate between “personal” accounts, which are off limits to
employers, and “nonpersonal accounts” which are not, yet some fail to
define those terms or otherwise explain how a personal account differs
from a nonpersonal one.217 Others provide a definition that lacks logic or
consistency218 or that is so narrow that it essentially loses all meaning. For
example, the Utah statute defines a “personal internet account” as one that
an applicant or employee uses “exclusively for personal communications
unrelated to any business purpose of the employer.”219 The following
section excludes from the definition “an account created, maintained,
used, or accessed by an employee or applicant for business related com-
munications or for a business purpose of the employer.”220 These provi-
sions fail to consider the fact that many social media accounts serve a dual
purpose, both personal and professional, and thus give far too much
deference to the employer by arguably allowing the employer access to an
employee’s personal Internet account if the employee makes even one
reference about or on behalf of her employer. Professor Eric Goldman, for
28, 2012, 12:39 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2012/09/28/big-problems-in
-californias-new-law-restricting-employers-access-to-employees-online-accounts/ (“[T]he law
governs effectively all digital content and activity, both on the Internet and stored in local
storage devices, not just social media. After all, what digital resource isn’t ‘an electronic service
or account, or electronic content’? The coverage of the law has focused only on its application
to social media accounts, but the law’s unexpectedly broad reach—including to locally-stored
content—virtually ensures that the law will have unintended consequences.”).
216820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/10(b)(4) (West 2012) (“ ‘Social networking website’ shall not
include electronic mail.”). Several proposed bills also exclude email. See, e.g., Minnesota (H.F.
2963, 87th Sess. (Minn. 2012)); Mississippi (H.B. 165, Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2013)); Missouri
(H.B.286, 97th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013)); Nebraska (L.B. 58, 103d Leg., 1st
Sess. (Neb. 2013)); North Dakota (H.B. 1455, 63d Leg. Assemb. (N.D. 2013)); South Carolina
(H. B. 5105, 119th Sess. (S.C. 2012)).
217See supra text preceding and accompanying note 52.
218For example, in the provision defining “social media account,” the Rhode Island statute
states that it “does not include an account opened at an employer’s behest, or provided by an
employer, or intended to be used primarily on behalf of the employer”—as though such an
account is somehow not a “social media account.” See 2014 R.I. Pub. Law S2095A (to be
codified at R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-56-1(1) (West 2014) (effective June 30, 2014). See also L.B.
1194 2013 Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2013). If the Rhode Island and Maine legislatures do not
want social media accounts used for employment purposes to be covered by the acts, they
would be better off simply excluding such accounts from their purview.
219UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-48-102(4)(a) (West 2013) (emphasis added).
220Id. § 34-48-102(4)(b).
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example, criticizes California’s statute for applying to personal social
media without defining when a social media account is “personal.”221 He
argues that while the law considers social media to be in only two states—
personal or nonpersonal—social media accounts fit along a continuum
with those two states as the end points.222 In reality, “employers and
employees routinely disagree about whether or not a social media account
was personal or business-related.”223
The Proposed Act clears up the conceptual difficulty regarding what
type of accounts are covered with one comprehensive provision that
clearly defines a “personal online account” and specifies what is meant by
the word “personal.” Although it borrows language from the Utah statute,
it removes the implication that a personal account is only one that is
unrelated to any business purpose of the employer and substitutes that
with language from the New Hampshire bill, which prohibits attempted
access to accounts that are used “primarily” for personal communica-
tions.224 This definition is reflective of the continuum of online account
ownership that Professor Goldman expressed above. It could also be
instructive to courts that wrestle with the increasing number of employ-
ment cases regarding the “ownership” of social media accounts.225
The “online account or service” portion of the phrase was defined as
broadly as possible to avoid becoming obsolete as technology changes.
Although provisions regarding an employer’s access to accounts in which
it has a legitimate interest are found in myriad places within the statutes
and proposed bills, it is most appropriately placed as an exception to
221Goldman, supra note 215.
222Id.
223Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 122–129; see also Scott A. Schaefers, Oregon the Latest
State to Pass Social Networking Privacy Legislation; Vermont Establishes Committee to Study and
Recommend Such Legislation, TRADING SECRETS ( June 7, 2013), http://www.tradesecretslaw
.com/2013/06/articles/legislation-2/oregon-the-latest-state-to-pass-social-networking-privacy
-legislation-vermont-establishes-committee-to-study-and-recommend-such-legislation/ (“The
Oregon law does not define ‘personal’ accounts, or on the flip side, those which are ‘provided
by, or on behalf of, the employer, or to be used on behalf of the employer.’ ”);
Torphy-Donzella, supra note 9, (“[W]hile [Maryland’s] law quite reasonably does not constrain
an employer from demanding pass codes to ‘non-personal’ sites and devices, it does not
provide any definition of what would be ‘personal’ as opposed to ‘business.’ ”).
224H.B. 1407, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess., (N.H. 2014).
225See supra text accompanying notes 122–130.
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prohibited acts. Thus, it is placed there in the Proposed Act and is
addressed in more detail below—when discussing Exceptions.
The Proposed Act intentionally steers away from a focus on electronic
devices, which is both misleading and unnecessary. Those statutes that
apply specifically to the employee’s or applicant’s device may unwittingly
provide a loophole for employers to avoid violating the law by simply
asking the employee or applicant to open an account on an employer-
owned device.226 Moreover, the intent behind this legislation is to protect
personal employee communications and content posted to and through
their online accounts, not the means of access to those accounts. Thus, it is
fitting that those accounts are the focus of the legislation that is intended
to protect them.
Section (II)—Prohibited Acts. The specific language in the propos-
al’s Prohibited Acts section is simple in form and yet comprehensive, thus
resolving the confusion caused by the multitude of prohibited acts and
their inconsistent treatment in the various statutes. The point of this
legislation is to prohibit access to private material, so the language should
be comprehensive enough to prohibit this in any form and by any
method.227 The employer may not ask for direct access through a user-
name and password or indirect access through shoulder surfing, require
the employee to “friend” the employer or the employer’s representative,228
or change privacy settings so that private content becomes visible to the
226For instance, the Colorado law prohibits the employer from requiring disclosure of “any
user name, password, or other means for accessing the employee’s or applicant’s personal
account or service through the employee’s or applicant’s personal electronic communications device.”
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-127(2)(a) (West 2013) (emphasis added). The inclusion of this
language could suggest that the employer is not prohibited from asking for password
information for the employee’s personal accounts that may, of course, be accessed from the
employer’s own computer.
227See Buckley, supra note 19, at 887–88 (“The reality is that the undesired conduct at issue . . .
may be achieved through multiple techniques. Any attempt to eradicate the undesired
conduct must effectively deter all method of engaging in such conduct. An employer may
request a password so that he can access password-protected material, or he may instead
‘shoulder surf ’ so as to escape liability under poorly crafted legislation. In order to unequivo-
cally proscribe all methods of accessing password-protected material, Congress must prohibit
demands for passwords, as well as demands for individuals to access private material in the
presence of those who are prohibited from viewing it.”).
228In their discussion of the survey that is the topic of their article, Abril et al. suggest that
many employees believe it can be appropriate to “blend worlds” by inviting employers or
supervisors to become a contact on a social networking website. Abril et al., supra note 82, at
102. This may be true in many instances, and, indeed, is not prohibited by this proposal
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public. Retaliation language is similarly straightforward and broad “to
encourage employees to advocate for and enforce their rights to
privacy.”229
The Proposed Act intentionally excludes language that prohibits
employers from asking applicants or employees whether they have social
media accounts. Such a prohibition is overbroad and could, for example,
exclude employers who are seeking to hire a social media-marketing
specialist from asking about their previous experience with social media
accounts.230
Section (III)—Exceptions. Practitioners who represent employers
appear to be most pleased by those state statutes that contain robust
exceptions.231 These lawyers object to the lack of exceptions contained in
some of the legislation, or argue that the exceptions that do exist are too
narrow and do not allow employers to investigate workplace misconduct
such as harassment, misuse of employer-owned equipment, or misappro-
priation of trade secrets.232 Admittedly, cases will arise in which an
because it limits only the employer from making the request, out of respect for the employee’s
privacy interests. An employee who wishes to forgo some of that privacy may make the
request of the employer.
229Levinson, supra note 16, at 429.
230New Jersey Governor Chris Christie initially vetoed the bill in New Jersey in part because
of such a provision. Letter from N.J. Governor Chris Christi to the New Jersey General
Assembly (May 6, 2013), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2012/Bills/A3000/2878
_V2.HTM (“Unfortunately, this bill paints with too broad a brush. For example, under this
bill, an employer interviewing a candidate for a marketing job would be prohibited from
asking about the candidate’s use of social networking so as to gauge the candidate’s techno-
logical skills and media savvy. Such a relevant and innocuous inquiry would, under this bill,
subject an employer to protracted litigation, compensatory damages, and attorneys’ fees—a
result that could not have been the sponsors’ intent.”).
231See, e.g., Philip L. Gordon & Lauren Woon, Re-Thinking and Rejecting Social Media
“Password Protection” Legislation, WORKPLACE PRIVACY COUNS. ( July 10, 2012), http://
www.littler.com/2012/07/articles/state-law-claims/re-thinking-and-rejecting-social-media-
password-protection-legislation (criticizing some of the legislation’s exceptions as being
“unjustifiably narrow”).
232See, e.g., Beth Zoller, Legislatures Aim to Protect Social Media Privacy of Employees and
Applicants, XPERT HR.COM ( July 10, 2012), http://www.xperthr.com/news/legislatures-aim-to-
protect-social-media-privacy-of-employees-and-applicants/7458/; Gordon, supra note 9 (“The
absence of any exceptions to the general prohibition in the Illinois bill highlights another
challenge for employers raised by this new genre of workplace regulation. The Maryland law
contains exceptions for investigations of suspected securities fraud violations and suspected
misappropriation of trade secrets. While these exceptions themselves are overly narrow, their
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employer has a legitimate business reason for viewing an employee’s
private account.233 Employers have a legitimate interest in their reputa-
tions, and in running a safe and efficient operation, as well as knowing the
background and public profiles of employees and job applicants as that
information relates to the employee’s or applicant’s ability to perform the
job. Thus, some exceptions are indeed necessary, if for no other reason
than a provision that includes exceptions will make clear that any other
activity, besides that provided in the statute, is not allowed.
The Proposed Act provides an exception to allow employers to
conduct reasonable, formal investigations into workplace misconduct. This
allows employers to investigate workplace issues such as claims of harass-
ment and bullying.234 However, this exception extends only to the sharing
of relevant content, similar to the Oregon and Washington statutes,235
rather than allowing the employer to ask for login information, which
presumably may be used outside of the employee’s or applicant’s presence.
Thus, this exception would allow an employer to conduct a valid investi-
gation into employee misconduct by taking a quick look into certain areas
of the employee’s personal online account, in the employee’s presence, for
reasonable investigative purposes only, without necessarily giving the
employer carte blanche access to all of the content on the profile. The
Proposed Act requires that any information upon which the employer
bases a request to view content of an employee’s or applicant’s personal
online account must be reasonably true and reliable. This language best
balances the employer’s legitimate interests and the employee’s privacy
(and the privacy of those with whom the employee has interacted on the
social networking site). Lastly, employers retain the right to access any
absence from the Illinois bill suggests that the states are beginning to weave yet another
inconsistent patchwork of laws that will further complicate for employers the already daunt-
ing challenge of regulating new technology in the workplace.”).
233See Poore, supra note 8, at 508 (“While employers . . . have valid interests in monitoring
users on their own networks for reasons related to security, productivity, protecting confi-
dential and proprietary information, and protecting their reputations and brands, the leg-
islation can carve exceptions for such monitoring, and at the same time, shield off-duty social
media activity and protected social media communications in the workplace . . . setting from
invasions of privacy.”) (footnote omitted).
234See GORDON ET AL., supra note 137, at 11–12.
235OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.330(4) (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.44.200(2) (West
2013).
828 Vol. 51 / American Business Law Journal
material available in the public domain. Although this language is unnec-
essary, as courts across the country have almost universally ruled that there
is no right to privacy associated with material individuals post for public
viewing on the Internet, enough states have included this language in their
individual statutes that its inclusion is likely to be helpful to employers as
they work to determine permissible boundaries.236
The statutes and bills contain many exceptions that were intention-
ally left out of the Proposed Act. Those exceptions that allow employers to
access personal accounts to look for unauthorized downloading of confi-
dential or proprietary information or securities laws violations are unnec-
essary, as is an exemption for law enforcement employers. Employers
already have available safety mechanisms and procedures upon which they
can rely if they believe these violations are occurring.237 For example, the
broad exceptions contained in the proposed federal Password Protection
Act, which exempt government employees and any employees who work
236However, this does not necessarily mean that the practice of doing Internet searches on job
applicants or current employees is wise. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 7 (“While the potential
upside of social media screening is the ability to obtain potentially valuable information
showing the applicant to not be a desirable candidate for a position, one potential downside
is that the employer may unwittingly gain knowledge of protected-class-status information,
such as the religion, age, marital or pregnancy status, or sexual orientation of an appli-
cant. . . . Thus, it may be better to rely on objective qualifications and engaging in personal
interaction and assessment rather than to cast a wide net in terms of information gathering
in the hopes of unearthing a single, perhaps salacious, disqualifying trait.”).
237See AP, Bill Would Allow Bosses to Seek Facebook Passwords, CBS CHARLOTTE (Apr. 3, 2013, 2:12
PM), http://charlotte.cbslocal.com/2013/04/03/bill-would-allow-bosses-to-seek-facebook-
passwords/ (“University of Washington law professor Ryan Calo, who studies emerging
technologies, said companies have federal, state and common laws that protect proprietary
information. ‘At first blush, it looks pretty common sense. If you’re trying to investigate what
happened and you suspect one of your employees, it seems like common sense you should be
able to do this, however, there are legal mechanisms,’ he said.”); Lynne Bernabei & Alan R.
Kabat, Invasions of Privacy, NAT’L L.J. ( July 23, 2013), available at http://bernabeipllc.com/wp-
content/uploads/Bernabei-Kabat-July-23-2012-National-Law-Journal.pdf (“Delaware’s pro-
posed legislation exempts law enforcement agencies—precisely the employment sector that
motivated Maryland’s legislation. It also proposes to exempt ‘employers in the financial
services industry’ . . . . This loophole is big enough to drive a truck through, since the
financial sector is one of the largest employers in Delaware, and almost anything can be an
‘internal investigation.’ ”); Rebecca Herold, Good Intentions Often Lead to Bad Privacy Results,
PRIVACY PROFESSOR BLOG (Apr. 29, 2013, 9:31 PM), http://privacyguidance.com/blog/good-
intentions-often-lead-to-bad-privacy-results/ (“There are already ways to investigate insider
trading, as well as other types of insider fraud, which could be occurring within personal
accounts. You get a warrant for that, or take other appropriate actions.”).
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with children under age thirteen,238 are also unnecessary and, as such,
simply unacceptable. As ACLU Legislative Counsel Chris Calabrese states,
“These sections authorize sweeping and unnecessary fishing expeditions.
There are already a broad range of tools for investigating misconduct. . . .
Just because you work for the government or with children, you shouldn’t
forfeit the right to a private life online.”239
Section (IV)—Waiver of Rights. Generally, because the employee-
employer relationship is contractual, rights can be waived unless other-
wise prohibited by law.240 For instance, waivers have been found to be
generally enforceable in separation and arbitration agreements,241 in the
absence of statutory language that expressly prohibits such a waiver.242
Accordingly, a statute that grants employees specific rights regarding the
privacy of their personal online accounts, without inclusion of an
antiwaiver provision, runs the risk of being essentially meaningless if
employers are free to request a waiver of rights under this law as a
condition of employment. Thus, this provision is an important section of
the Proposed Act.
238H.R. 2077, § (2)(d)(2)(B)(iii), S. 1426, § (2)(d)(2)(B)(iii), 113th Cong. (2013).
239Chris Calabrese, Password Protection Act of 2012: A Good Start Against Employer Snooping,
ACLU FREE FUTURE BLOG (May 9, 2012, 6:06 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/technology
-and-liberty/password-protection-act-2012-good-start-against-employer-snooping; see also
Bernabei & Kabat, supra note 237 (“The federal Password Protection Act of 2012 would allow
executive-branch agencies to exempt positions ‘requiring eligibility for access to classified
information.’ Since more than 4.2 million federal employees and contractors have security
clearances, this means that numerous individuals could be required to disclose their private
information in order to keep their jobs.”).
240See Eve I. Klein et al., Navigating the Murky Waters of Employment Waivers and Releases, 82 N.Y.
ST. B. ASS’N J., no. 2, 2010, at 32.
241See, e.g., EEOC v. SunDance Rehabilitation Corp., 466 F.3d 490, 499 (6th Cir. 2006) (“This
court has upheld employees’ waivers of claims under ADEA, EPA, and Title VII where the
waiver was executed voluntarily and intelligently.”); see also AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (upholding validity of arbitration agreement waiving
customers’ rights to participate in class action lawsuits); D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d
344 (5th Cir. 2013) (upholding validity of arbitration agreement waiving employees rights to
participate in collective employment-related claims).
242See D.R. Horton, Inc., 737 F.3d at 360 (noting the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) “establishes
a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements” unless the “FAA’s mandate
has been overridden by a contrary congressional command”) (internal quotation marks
omitted.).
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Section (V)—Remedies. Lastly, the Proposed Act addresses the
diverse remedies from state to state, which to some are particularly
troublesome.243 The Proposed Act provides for a civil remedy since, at its
essence, violation of this act is an invasion of privacy, which is typically
remedied through a civil rather than criminal action. Making an offense of
the statute a criminal act as well as imposing civil penalties seems both
unnecessary and contrary to other statutes regarding employment law.244 A
private cause of action is desirable,245 but the Proposed Act also delegates
some possible responsibility to an administrative agency, as well as the
courts, to allow the agency to proactively educate and enforce the law,
reduce financial costs to the parties, and permit “decision makers with
expertise in the area to be involved.”246 The penalty provision of the
Proposed Act reflects an attempt to impose a penalty that is strong enough
to have real impact without being punitive. Weak civil penalties, such as
243Bernabei & Kabat, supra note 237 (“The bad news is that these legislative efforts have a
hodgepodge of enforcement mechanisms. For example, there are five bills pending in New
York, two of which have both civil and administrative remedies, one of which has an
administrative remedy alone and two of which have no statutory remedies. Michigan’s and
Washington’s bills provide for a civil action for legal and equitable remedies; Michigan’s also
would create a misdemeanor offense punishable by up to 93 days in jail. New Jersey’s and
Ohio’s bills provide both administrative enforcement and a civil action. Delaware and Illinois
drafted their legislation as part of pre-existing statutes with enforcement mechanisms
through both a state agency and a civil action.”).
244For instance, common law privacy violations are torts rather than crimes. Moreover, most
employment discrimination statutes result in civil rather than criminal penalties. Violation of
this law should be no different.
245See Levinson, supra note 16, at 416, n.490 (“[W]ithout a private cause of action, ‘there is
likely to be significant underenforcement of privacy interests.’ ”) (quoting Paul M. Schwartz,
Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 925–26 (2009)).
246Id. at 429. Regarding the proposed federal “Privacy Protection in Employment Act” that is
the subject of her article, Levinson suggests,
[T]he DOL is most likely to use an enforcement mechanism that is well suited to
protecting employees’ right to privacy. The agency already has in place mechanisms
to provide compliance guidance, opinion letters, recommendations as to resolving
disputes, and adjudicatory administrative hearings. While filing a claim with
the DOL permits an employee a low cost means to settle a dispute, filing with the
DOL is not generally a prerequisite to filing in court. Thus, employees are
provided the option of a court suit rather than agency dispute resolution should they
so prefer.
Id. at 430.
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those in the Utah and Washington statutes, which impose only civil pen-
alties of up to $500,247 are unlikely to have the desired deterrent effect. On
the other hand, the $10,000 penalty contemplated in SNOPA248 may strike
many as being too punitive, especially for a first offense. The proposal
strikes a balance between those two approaches, imposing a fine of $1,000
for the first offense and allowing the court or administrative agency to
impose a higher fine of up to $5,000 for subsequent violations. It gives the
court discretion to award attorneys’ fees and costs as well as actual damages
and injunctive relief as may be shown and warranted.
The Proposed Act deliberately omits other miscellaneous provisions
found in several of the laws and bills. Some statutory language, such as that
found in the Michigan and Utah statutes, specifically provides that the law
“does not prohibit or restrict an employer from complying with a duty to
screen employees or applicants prior to hiring . . . .”249 This provision is
unnecessary—the intent of these statutes is primarily employee protection
of private information, not to impact on an employer’s obligation to make
reasonable hiring decisions. These same two statutes state specifically that
they are not intended to create a duty for an employer “to search or
monitor the activity of a personal internet account”250 or that an employer
will not be liable for failing to request or require an employee or applicant
for access to a social media account.251 In other words, these laws inexpli-
cably state that the employer has no duty to engage in behavior that is
already prohibited by the statute and then absolve employers from liability
for abiding by the law. These provisions are nonsensical. If the law spe-
cifically prohibits an employer from accessing an employee’s or applicant’s
online account, there is certainly no need to state elsewhere that the
employer has no duty to do so.
247UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-48-301(2) (West 2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.44.205(1) (West
2013).
248Social Network Online Protection Act, H.R. 537, § (2)(b)(1)(A), 113th Cong. (2013).
249MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.275(2) (West 2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-48-202(3) (West
2013).
250MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.277(1); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-48-203(1).
251MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.277(2); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-48-203(2).
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CONCLUSION
In less than three years, forty-four states have enacted or considered
legislation that increases employee and job candidate privacy rights by
limiting employer access to their personal online information. In this
technological world, where employee privacy rights are, at least according
to some, nonexistent, this legislative move toward restoring some of these
rights is definitely a step in the right direction. However, current legislative
attempts fall short of a fair balance between those rights and employers’
legitimate business-related interests. Federal legislation is the best solution
to clean up the wide disparity among the state statutes and bills. The
Proposed Act set forth in this article is intended to help restore that
balance. It defines the relevant terms, clearly describes the prohibited acts,
and provides for reasonable exceptions for valid business-related pur-
poses. Codification of this uniform standard would help to prevent the
kinds of abuses described in the Introduction of this article while at the
same time giving employers access to relevant information for legitimate
business reasons.
2014 / Employee Internet Privacy 833
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